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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING
 Beslissingen van consumenten zijn doorgaans slechts gebaseerd op een klein gedeelte
van alle informatie die ze ter beschikking hebben. Daarenboven baseren ze hun keuzes
vaak niet zozeer op de meest relevante of meest betrouwbare elementen; eerder baseren
ze zich op die elementen die ze gemakkelijk kunnen ophalen uit hun geheugen. Dit
proefschrift omvat 3 empirische hoofdstukken die dieper ingaan op de invloed die de
toegankelijkheid van een concept in het geheugen heeft op de keuzes die consumenten
maken.
 In het eerste empirische hoofdstuk wordt dieper ingegaan op hoe de toegankelijkheid
van concepten wordt beïnvloed door de motivaties (d.i., de doelen die mensen zich stellen
en de concretere plannen die ze maken om deze doelen te bereiken) die consumenten
hebben. Dagelijks stellen consumenten zich bepaalde doelen of maken ze plannen over
hun toekomstige aankopen. Bijvoorbeeld, iemand kan ’s ochtends plannen om na het
werk langs de supermarkt te gaan om daar de ingrediënten voor het avondeten te kopen.
Voor consumenten heeft het enkel zin om deze plannen of intenties te maken als ze die
ook daadwerkelijk kunnen uitvoeren. Voorwaarde hiervoor is dat ze hun intenties kunnen
onthouden. Indien ze ’s avonds vergeten langs de supermarkt te gaan, of indien ze niet
meer weten wat ze nodig hebben heeft het weinig zin om daar op voorhand plannen voor
te maken. Gelukkig, heeft het vormen van aankoopintenties wel vaak zin omdat intenties
ondersteund worden door een specifiek mechanisme dat een invloed heeft op het gemak
waarmee iets kan opgehaald worden uit het geheugen, of de toegankelijkheid van
concepten. Specifiek, wanneer concepten het onderwerp van een bepaald doel of een
bepaalde intentie (of enig andere motivatie) zijn, worden ze toegankelijker waardoor ze
een grotere invloed hebben op de beslissingen van consumenten. In dit hoofdstuk tonen
we aan dat dit specifiek mechanisme op gang gebracht kan worden door simpelweg een
intentievraag te beantwoorden. Daarenboven zorgt dit mechanisme ervoor dat de kans dat
consumenten hun gedrag gaan herhalen verkleint. Dit blijkt echter ook het geval te zijn in
situaties waarin de preventie van repititief gedrag niet noodzakelijk is.
 In het tweede empirische hoofdstuk bestuderen we of en wanneer het meer
toegankelijk maken van 1 bepaald merk de keuzes die consumenten maken verandert.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
- 16 -
Meer bepaald gaan we na of selectief meer aandacht geven aan een niet meest
geprefereerd merk ervoor kan zorgen dat de consument voor dit merk en niet voor z’n
meest geprefereerde merk kiest. Onderzoek heeft reeds aangetoond dat dit inderdaad zo
is. Posavac e. a. (2002) lieten consumenten een keuze maken uit alternatieven. Juist voor
ze deze keuze moesten maken, brachten ze de respondenten een alternatief onder de
aandacht waarvan ze wisten dat het niet de voorkeur wegdroeg van de respondenten. Het
selectief focussen op (i.e. aandacht geven aan) een niet meest geprefereerd alternatief
vergrootte de kans dat dit alternatief gekozen werd. De vraag is echter of dit steeds het
geval is. Recent vonden Coates e.a. (2004) dat selectief focussen op een niet meest
geprefereerd alternatief er enkel voor zorgt dat meer consumenten dit alternatief in
overweging gaan nemen, maar niet dat ze het daadwerkelijk ook gaan kiezen. De
resultaten van ons onderzoek tonen aan dat de mate van betrokkenheid van de consument
het effect van selectieve aandacht op de uiteindelijk keuze modereert. Door aan te tonen
dat selectief aandacht geven aan een niet meest geprefereerd merk enkel de keuzes van
laag betrokken consumenten beïnvloedt, kunnen we de tegenstrijdige bevindingen die
gerapporteerd werden in voorgaand onderzoek met elkaar verzoenen. Daarenboven
vinden we dat het focale alternatief slechts oppervlakkig verwerkt dient te worden om de
keuze te beïnvloeden.
 Het toegankelijk maken van een bepaald concept kan een invloed hebben op de
toegankelijkheid van gerelateerde concepten. Bijvoorbeeld, het zien van een hond kan
ook concepten als leiband, kat, huisdier, etc. toegankelijker maken. Hoe uitgebreid die
verspreiding van activatie onder gerelateerde concepten precies is kan beïnvloed worden
door verschillende factoren. Zo tonen we in het derde hoofdstuk aan dat omlaag kijken
zorgt voor een beperkte verspreiding van activatie terwijl omhoog kijken leidt tot een
uitgebreidere verspreiding van activatie. Daarenboven vinden we de mate van
verspreiding van acitivatie een invloed heeft op de keuzes van consumenten
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
 Imagine yourself standing in the grocery store in front of a shelf stacked with
packages of candy bars, deciding which of the presented brands you want to purchase.
· Before entering the store, you are asked to fill out a questionnaire on your purchase
intention for snack bars. Would the simple act of expressing your purchase intention
beforehand affect the choice you subsequently make? And, assuming you
unexpectedly make a second choice in the snack bar category, would the likelihood of
choosing again for the same brand depend on whether you have a priori expressed
your purchase intentions?
· Would your brand choice be influenced if before entering the store your attention had
been grabbed by an advertisement for another snack bar brand than your most
preferred brand? Would your choice depend on how deeply you processed the
information provided in the ad, and/or on how important you consider the decision.
· Or, would your choice be different when the candy bars are stacked on a high or on a
low shelve? Would merely having to look up or look down on the assortment affect
the brand you ultimately choose?
It may never have occurred to you that responding to a questionnaire, being exposed to an
ad or simply having to look up or down when deciding which brand to buy, may exert a
significant influence on such a simple decision as purchasing a candy bar, yet the
research reported in this doctoral dissertation suggests that the answer to all of the above
questions is affirmative.
 This doctoral dissertation contributes to answering each of these questions by relying
on knowledge accessibility theory. In essence, knowledge accessibility theory departs
from the fact that people’s judgments and decisions are typically based on only a small
subset of the knowledge they could potentially rely on (Wyer, 2008). From all the
information people have stored in memory only a small part is likely to be retrieved when
forming a judgment or making a choice. Knowledge accessibility refers to the ease with
which information can be retrieved from memory (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). Knowledge
accessibility theory is a framework well-researched in psychology and widely used to
account for findings in the consumer behavior domain. Purchase decisions, like
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
- 20 -
judgments and decisions more generally, are often based on whatever constructs happen
to be accessible at that time (Wyer, 2008).
 In what follows we briefly introduce the knowledge accessibility framework by
discussing (1) what knowledge is, (2) how it is represented in memory, (3) what are the
most important determinants of knowledge accessibility and inhibition, and (4) how
accessible knowledge affects judgments and decisions. Afterwards, we describe how the
studies of this doctoral dissertation use knowledge accessibility theory as a framework to
predict the behavior of consumers in certain situations.
1. KNOWLEDGE ACCESSIBILITY FRAMEWORK
1.1 What is Knowledge?
Generally, two broad types of knowledge are stored in memory: declarative
knowledge and procedural knowledge (see Figure 1). Declarative knowledge “concerns
the referents of everyday life experiences” (Wyer, 2008, p. 32). This type of knowledge
comprises a broad variety of constructs, such as knowledge on persons, objects and
events; representations of specific experiences we have had; personal goals, values and
opinions; and prototypic sequences of events that occur frequently (Wyer & Xu, 2010).
In sum, declarative knowledge represents coherent information about specific constructs
and categories. That is, information about a specific individual object or event, or
information on a class of objects, events or properties may be stored (Higgins & King,
1981). Based on these levels of specificity of information, a distinction between two
types of declarative knowledge can be made. Episodic declarative knowledge refers to
the memory for concrete personal events and the temporal-spatial relations among these
events (e.g., my trip to the United States, the first time I ate out at a Mexican restaurant),
whereas semantic memory represents more abstract, context-free knowledge (e.g.,
vacation trips, restaurant visits). It represents organized knowledge that a person
possesses about words, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and
about rules and algorithms for the manipulation of symbols, concepts and their relations
(Tulving, 1972).
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A second broad type of knowledge stored in memory concerns procedural knowledge,
which refers to “sequences of actions that one performs in pursuit of a particular goal”
(Wyer, 2008, p. 32), or ‘procedures’ (Wyer & Xu, 2010). Such procedures consist of a
number of cognitive or motor actions that are normally performed sequentially in pursuit
of the objective at hand (Wyer & Xu, 2010). For example, we know how to make a cup
of coffee, to set the table, and to drive a car. These procedures are generally stored in
memory as part of declarative knowledge and can be deliberately retrieved and consulted.
Once a procedure is well-learned, however, it may often be applied automatically (Wyer,
2008; Wyer & Xu, 2010).
 Figure 1. Types of Knowledge
As the research in this dissertation is solely concerned with declarative knowledge,
the next section will focus on how declarative knowledge is stored in memory. Next, we
proceed with a description of a set of principles that guide the activation processes of
declarative knowledge.
Human Memory
Procedural
Knowledge
Declarative
Knowledge
Semantic
Knowledge
Episodic
Knowledge
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1.2 How is Knowledge Represented in Memory?
With respect to declarative knowledge, an associative model formulation is a widely
accepted conceptualization of memory structure (Anderson, 1983; Wyer & Srull, 1989).
For example, the associative network memory model views knowledge as consisting of a
set of nodes and links. Nodes are stored information connected by links that vary in
strength (Keller, 1993). The associative network model of memory is also a common way
for consumer researchers to conceptualize the organization of brands and brand-related
information in memory (Mantonakis, Whitllesea & Yoon, 2008; Nedungadi, 1990).
Hence, brand knowledge can be conceptualized as consisting of a brand node in memory
to which a variety of associations are linked. Specifically, brand associations are the
informational nodes that are linked to the brand node and contain the meaning of the
brand for consumers, such as attributes, benefits and brand attitudes (Keller, 1993).
1.3 Determinants of Knowledge Accessibility
One major aspect in the work on knowledge accessibility has been identifying factors
that increase or decrease the accessibility of certain memory representations. Across
several years, attention and memory researchers have argued that besides activation
processes, inhibitory processes are an equally fundamental part of human cognitive
processes1 (e.g., Anderson & Bell, 2001; Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; Healey et al.,
2010, Storm & Nestojko, 2010). Hence, not only factors that increase a construct’s
accessibility, but also factors that actively decrease a construct’s accessibility can be
discerned. In what follows, we will discuss the factors that result in increased activation,
and identify those determinants that may exert an inhibitory effect. In addition, we
demonstrate the importance of knowledge accessibility in guiding consumer behavior by
providing examples on how each of the discussed determinants affects consumer
behavior.
1 The existence of inhibitory processes is not (yet) unequivocally accepted, as more parsimonious
explanations can often account for findings ascribed to inhibitory processes. Yet, a growing body of
research focuses on providing direct evidence for the role of active suppression in certain memory retrieval
processes (e.g., Anderson & Bell, 2001; Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Healey et al., 2010).
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Overall, construct accessibility is a function of three main determinants: (1) The
strength of a construct’s activation, (2) the strength of association between a construct
and other active constructs, and (3) the availability of retrieval cues. In addition to these
three major determinants of construct activation, a fourth determinant, generally referred
to as the conceptual scope of attention, can be discerned. Research on the conceptual
scope of attention has been limited, yet investigating its antecedents and implications for
consumer behavior is equally important as studying the other determinants of
accessibility.
1.3.1 The Strength of a Construct’s Activation
The strength of a construct’s activation is a function of the recency, frequency, and
salience of the construct (Nedungadi, 1990). Higgins and King (1981) include motivation
as an additional determinant of construct accessibility. First, the recency of activation
refers to the time since the most recent activation of a construct (Higgins & King, 1981,
Wyer & Srull, 1986). A study of Nedungadi (1990) nicely illustrates that a recent
exposure to a brand affects consumers’ decision making. Recently primed brands are
more likely to be included in and chosen from a consumer’s consideration set.
Second, also the frequency of activation of a construct heightens a construct’s
accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1986). It has been shown that merely
answering attitude questions increases attitude accessibility and that repeated
measurement of an attitude leads to even greater accessibility (e.g., Chapman, 2001;
Downing, Judd & Brauer, 1992; Fazio, Chen, McDonel & Sherman, 1982; Powell &
Fazio, 1984; Roese & Olson, 1994). Specifically, Fazio et al. (1982) report shorter
response latencies for respondents whose attitudes were measured only once. Not only
does frequency of activation impact brand latencies, it can also affect purchase behavior.
These repeated incidental consumer brand encounters have been shown to increase the
choice of the focal brand (Ferraro, Bettman & Chartrand, 2009).
 In addition, repetitive activation of constructs has also been suggested to have an
inhibitory effect. Specifically, retrieval induced forgetting refers to the fact that repeated
practice of recalling some members of a category impairs later recall of other members of
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
- 24 -
that class, but not members of other classes (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994;
Mantonakis, Whittlesea & Yoon, 2008). The notion is that repeated practice of some
members of a class requires inhibition or suppression of unpracticed members of that
category. Inhibition persists and prevents later recall of the unpracticed members. The
result is that subjects are less likely to recall unpracticed items from practiced categories
than items from non-practiced categories. Importantly, other categories are unaffected.
Hence, having subjects think about one or more particular brands may not only increase
the likelihood that these brands are considered for purchase, but can also inhibit the
accessibility of other product category members that otherwise would be candidates for
purchase (Alba & Chattopadhyay, 1985, 1986; Miniard, Unnava & Bhatla, 1989; Hastak
& Mitra, 1996). This may be a reason to engage in comparative advertising in which a
brand is compared to inferior brands while ignoring superior brands. A similar finding
has also been demonstrated for recall of product attributes (Alba & Chattopadhyay,
1985). More specifically, marketers can determine the product dimensions on which they
want to be judged and, at the same time, inhibit consideration of alternative dimensions
on which their competitors are superior. Several studies in marketing have already
demonstrated how marketers could use advertising and point-of-purchase displays to
activate these inhibitor mechanisms in memory in order to gain a competitive advantage
(e.g., Burke & Srull, 1988).
Third, the accessibility of a construct is also affected by its salience in memory
(Higgins & King, 1981), which depends upon the prominence (a function of intensity,
complexity and vividness) and distinctiveness (determined by uniqueness) (Schmidt,
1991) of the construct. Most research on prominence has focused on the salience of
stimuli in the environment, such as the brand prominence in sponsoring (e.g., Johar &
Pham, 1999), in advergames (e.g., Cauberghe & De Pelsmacker, 2010), of product
placements (e.g., Cowley & Barron, 2008; Van Reijmersdal, 2009), or of in-store
marketing attempts (e.g., Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow, & Young, 2009). Only little
research deals with the accessibility of constructs derived from their prominence in
memory. Brand distinctiveness in memory has been shown to have implications in the
marketing domain though. Warlop, Ratneshwar and van Osselaer (2005), for example,
demonstrated that distinctive brand names and a distinctive packaging often increase the
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accuracy of consumers’ memory-based product evaluations. Distinctive brand names are
more likely to evoke the concomitant prior brand experiences rather than prior
experiences with other brands.
 Fourth, Higgins and King (1981) also include motivations (e.g., needs, values, goals,
plans) as determinants of construct accessibility. Social and cognitive psychological
motivation theories support this notion that motivation enhances the accessibility of
motivation-related constructs (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Förster, Liberman & Higgins,
2005). For instance, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) demonstrated an increased accessibility of
words as coffee, table, spoon, etcetera when an intention to set the table was formed.
They argued that the intentional status is encoded in memory by tagging an intended
activity with a ‘commitment marker’ (Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005).
 Research on the mental representation of motivational constructs not only suggests
that motivation enhances accessibility of motivation-related constructs; it also suggests
inhibition of competing motivational states (competing needs, goals or intentions)
(Kruglanski et al. 2002). Motivational states are believed to require shielding from
distraction in order to attain goals or complete intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). For
instance, Bayuk, Janiszewski and LeBoeuf (2010) demonstrated that activating a plan
encourages the execution of the plan while it discourages the execution of alternative,
out-of-plan behaviors. More specifically, they showed that adopting the plan to reduce
cholesterol by eating fewer eggs decreases the likelihood of exercising more to reduce
cholesterol. Another manifestation of motivational induced inhibition can be observed
upon fulfillment of the motivation (Liberman & Förster, 2000; Marsh, Hicks & Bink,
1998; Marsh, Hicks & Bryan, 1999; Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005). That is, having
completed a certain goal or intention decreases the accessibility of related information in
memory. This post-fulfillment inhibition has been suggested to occur in order to facilitate
the pursuit of the next motivational state in line. Inhibiting concepts related to a
completed intention would avoid its repetition (Marsh, Hicks & Bink, 1998).
  An important issue in memory accessibility research, related to these determinants of
knowledge activation, is the enduring character of states of heightened activation or
inhibition. The described determinants differ in whether their resulting change in
activation is likely to be momentary or prolonged. For instance, the influence of recency
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of activation on accessibility is often momentary in the sense that its effect rapidly decays
over time. An increase in construct accessibility evoked by a recent activation is likely to
dissipate within more or less 15 minutes (Forbach, Stanners & Hochhaus, 1974).
However, characteristics of the information itself determine the rate of decay in the
respondent’s ability to retrieve it. The recent activation of a more distinctive or prominent
(i.e., salient) construct is likely to decay slower compared to the activation of more trivial
constructs (Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980). Also, the frequent activation of
constructs can cause increased accessibility to persist longer. Hence, the effect of recency
rapidly decays over time, whereas the effect of frequency and saliency tends to decay
slower (Wyer, 2008).
Other than accessibility resulting from recency, frequency or saliency of activation is
that accessibility from motivational sources persists as long as the motivation is active
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trotschel, 2001).
For example, Goschke & Kuhl (1993) showed that constructs that are related to an active
intention remain increasingly accessible for as long as the intention is active. The
heightened state of activation persists up until the intention is completed (or cancelled).
In a similar vein, Bargh et al. (2001) showed that activation of an achievement goal
increased performance on an anagram task. Performance facilitation appeared to be more
pronounced after a delay compared to immediate performance facilitation. The
persistence of accessibility of unfulfilled goals and intentions until fulfillment is
functional as it helps to establish effective goal pursuit. Similarly, inhibition of constructs
competing with an active motivational construct persists as long as the motivation is
active (Veling & Van Knippenberg, 2006, 2008). The post-fulfillment inhibition is
thought of as temporary, which would rapidly decay over time (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
However, when the post-fulfillment inhibition in itself is functional in view of a new
active motivation, it is likely to persist up until completion of this motivation (Förster,
Liberman & Higgins, 2005).
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1.3.2 The Strength of Association between Concepts
 A second major determinant of knowledge accessibility is the strength of association
between the knowledge to be accessed and other, already accessible constructs (Higgins
& King, 1981; Wyer, 2008). For instance, activating knowledge on a brand increases the
probability of retrieving this brand from memory, but simultaneously also increases the
probability of retrieving other brands in the same product category. The activation of one
brand is likely to spread to other related brands in the network. This effect is most
pronounced for the most accessible, major brands after a minor, initially less accessible
brand is activated (Nedungadi, 1990). This is in line with the suggestion that the strength
of the association between a brand and other active brands is an important determinant of
knowledge accessibility. The spreading of activation is affected by the position of the
brand within the product category (Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 1985). A brand that is
strongly linked to a product category, such as prototypical brands (i.e., brands that are
considered to be most representative of the product category, such as Coca Cola for soft
drinks, Heinz for ketchup, the iPhone for smart phones etcetera), is more likely to be
activated from memory upon consideration of the product category, which has an
influence on brand choice (Sutherland & Galloway, 1981; Krugman, 1965). Fazio, Herr
and Powell (1992) introduced mystery ads as an effective means to create strong
category-brand associations.
 When considering the strength of association between concepts as a determinant of
knowledge accessibility, it is important to recognize that strengths of association may be
asymmetric. Specifically, it may be highly likely that thinking about a particular situation
will evoke a particular brand (e.g., something to drink while watching a romantic movie,
Cécémel hot chocolate comes to mind), but thinking of the brand will not necessarily
evoke that situation (Holden & Lutz, 1992). Similarly, categorization research has long
recognized that the strength of the link from an instance to a category is not necessarily
related to the strength of the category to instance link. The finding that minor brands in a
category are likely to lead to evocation of a major brand, but major brands are not likely
to lead to evocation of minor brands can be interpreted as providing evidence of
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asymmetries in the strength of associate-to-brand links versus brand-to-associate links
(Nedungadi, 1990).
1.3.3 The Availability of Retrieval Cues
Further, the availability of retrieval cues in the environment affects what can be
recalled at a certain moment. Hence, differences in physical and social circumstances
tend to cause differences in the accessibility of particular constructs for any person in the
situation (Higgins & King, 1981). For instance, Berger and Fitzsimons (2008)
demonstrated that even the activation of a construct (e.g., dogs) that is merely
conceptually or perceptually related to a specific brand (e.g., Puma) may increase this
brand’s accessibility. In turn, this increased accessibility influences product evaluation
and choice, which are shown to vary directly with the frequency of exposure to
conceptually related cues.
1.3.4 The Scope of Conceptual Attention
Finally, a consumer’s scope of conceptual attention is likely to play an important role
in both knowledge activation and inhibition. The scope of conceptual attention refers to
the breadth of activation of mental concepts. This activation may be restricted to the
mental representation of focal, highly activated concepts or may be extended to
semantically related concepts (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel &
Denzler, 2006; Rowe, Hirsh & Anderson, 2007). For example, the spreading of activation
from an active brand to a target brand is not only determined by the strength of
association between the two brands, but also the scope of conceptual attention might have
an effect. In certain situations the activation of mental representations may remain
restricted to those with the highest accessibility. In other instances, the range of activation
may be broader and spread to additional mental representations with lower a priori
accessibility (Förster et al., 2006). For example, upon activating the construct ‘pet’
consumers with a narrow scope of conceptual attention will be most likely to think only
of the most representative category exemplars such as dogs and cats, whereas individuals
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with a broad scope of attention could also think of less typical exemplars such as minks.
This limited or extended spreading of activation has been referred to as the scope of
conceptual attention, which can be either narrow or broad. Hence, the scope of
conceptual attention refers to the extent of the internal activation of concepts upon
attending a focal object (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Förster et al.,  2006; Rowe, Hirsh &
Anderson, 2007).
The scope of conceptual attention affects the extent of spreading of activation, and
may also lead to the inhibition of unattended concepts. Specifically, the retrieval of target
items from memory involves conceptually focused selective attention, in which the
internal spotlight of attention is directed to the mental representations of sought after
items (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Anderson & Spellman, 1995). This narrowing of the
scope of conceptual attention and the direction of attention to these target items leads to
the inhibition of items not in the spotlight of attention (Förster et al., 2006).
Research on the conceptual scope of attention has been limited, yet mood states, and
performing approach or avoidance behaviors have been suggested to affect the
conceptual scope of attention (Förster et al., 2006; Friedman & Förster, 2010).  Whereas
a large body of consumer behavior research draws upon spreading of activation as a
theoretical explanation for the reported findings, this body of research has largely
neglected that the extent of spreading of activation is not only a function of the strength
of association between concepts, but also depends on consumers’ scope of conceptual
attention.
1.4 Incorporating Accessible Knowledge in Judgments and Decisions
 The described determinants may all influence the accessibility of constructs in
memory. The question is how the accessibility of certain constructs affects subsequent
decision making.
 First, people rarely retrieve and use more knowledge than is necessary to attain their
objective. When each knowledge representation is sufficient to attain an objective on its
own, the first representation that comes to mind is most likely to be applied (Wyer,
2008). Hence, a judgment is a function of the accessibility or ease with which something
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can be retrieved from memory and the diagnosticity or the sufficiency of an input for a
judgment or choice task (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). This accessibility-diagnosticity
principle can explain the use of competing memory inputs and the use of memory versus
contextual information in judgment (Menon, Raghubir & Schwarz, 1995). This indicates
that knowledge accessibility can play an important role in both memory-based and
stimulus-based decision making. Specifically, in a memory-based choice, that is when a
consumer chooses a brand from a product category on the basis of information retrieved
from memory, easily retrieved memory inputs will be used when they are also diagnostic.
Hence, when none of the alternatives are physically present (e.g., when composing a
shopping list or choosing a restaurant), but also when not all competitors can be found at
the same location (e.g., car dealers), accessibility may help brands to gain a competitive
advantage.
 Furthermore, also in a stimulus-based choice decision, in which information relevant
to the decision is readily available in the physical environment, consumers may retrieve
information from memory as input to their decision (Lee, 2002). Relying on information
readily presented in the environment alone to make a choice would often be too time-
consuming and overwhelming in today’s complex choice environment. Even when all
alternatives are visually present, recall and inhibition of recall play an important role.
Hence, a stimulus-based choice situation often results in a decision based on mixed
information, whereby information available in the environment and information retrieved
from memory is combined (Alba, Hutchinson & Lynch, 1991). Which mixture of
information is used depends on the diagnosticity of the contextually available and easily
from memory retrieved information.
Second, whether information, available in the environment or retrieved from memory,
is sufficient depends on the time and effort one is willing and able to devote to judgment
formation and decision making (e.g., Kokkinaki & Lunt, 1997). When motivation and/or
ability are low, the threshold to judge a knowledge input as sufficient will be lower
compared to when motivation and ability are high (Keller, 1993).
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between retrieval from explicit and implicit
memory. This distinction refers to the differential role of consciousness in the retrieval of
information (Mantonakis, Whittlesea & Yoon, 2008). Consumers use implicit memory
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when retrieving information from memory without conscious recollection of its source,
whereas conscious retrieval of information arises from explicit memory (Samu &
Krishnan, 2010). Hence, implicit memory occurs without intentional retrieval, rather the
brand name seems familiar and is automatically activated in memory (Holden &
Vanhuele, 1999). This experience of familiarity an sich (i.e., processing fluency)
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), or even the experience of
ease of retrieving knowledge (i.e., retrieval fluency) (Fitzsimons et al., 2002;
Winkielman, Schwarz & Belli, 1998; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke,
Schwarz & Bless, 1995), apart from the actual retrieved knowledge or content, can also
be incorporated in subsequent judgments and choices. For instance, when participants
were asked to recall 12 examples of assertive behaviors, they rated themselves as less
assertive than when they were asked to recall only six examples (Schwarz et al., 1991).
Similarly, when an ad invites recipients to name either one reason or 10 reasons for
(against) choosing a BMW over a Mercedes, the participants experienced the retrieval of
one reason as easier than the retrieval of 10 reasons. Participants subsequently evaluated
BMW more (less) favorably and Mercedes less (more) favorably when the retrieval ease
was easy rather than difficult (Wänke, Bohner & Jurkowitsch, 1997).
 In sum, a large body of research has demonstrated the role of knowledge accessibility
in consumer behavior. It is not the goal of this dissertation to give an exhaustive overview
of the literature. Instead, each chapter focuses on a specific topic and discusses the
relevant literature. The next part provides an overview of the topics that will be discussed
in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
2. DISSERTATION OUTLINE
 Knowledge accessibility is a phenomenon that is well-addressed in consumer
behavior research. Although it has been shown to have a profound influence on numerous
aspects related to consumer behavior, several issues are still unclear and demand further
investigation. For example, the role of the conceptual scope of attention has hardly been
addressed in prior investigations of consumer behavior. This dissertation encloses three
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chapters that demonstrate and extend our knowledge on the pervasive influence of
declarative knowledge accessibility in consumer’s decision making.
  Chapter II, A Motivational Account of the Question-Behavior Effect, focuses on
motivations in general and intentions in specific as determinants of knowledge
accessibility. It describes the pattern of activation and inhibition of brands after
responding to an intention question. Specifically, responding to an intention question
leads to increased accessibility of the most preferred brand and a simultaneous inhibition
of other well-preferred, competing brands. When the intention is completed, that is when
a brand choice is made, the increased accessibility of the most preferred brand turns into
an opposite reversed state of inhibition. Furthermore, it demonstrates the motivational
nature of this accessibility pattern by identifying ‘functionality’ rather than ‘the passing
of time’ as an important property of activation and inhibition in this situation. The
reported findings are suggested to underlie the question-behavior effect, which describes
the change in behavior that arises after responding to an intention question (Sprott et al.,
2006).
 Chapter III, Combined Influence of Selective Focus and Decision Involvement for
Memory-based Choices, fine-tunes knowledge on the interplay between the well-
researched concepts of recency of activation (referred to as selective focus) and
processing motivation (i.e., decision involvement) in their influence on consideration set
composition and memory-based choice decisions. Specifically, marketers often use
salient stimuli to draw consumers’ attention to a specific brand in the hope that a
selective focus on the own brand increases the sales of this brand. However, previous
studies are inconsistent concerning the impact of selectively focusing on a specific brand
for a subsequent brand choice. To offer an explanation for these inconsistent results,
decision involvement is introduced as a moderator of the relation between selective focus
and brand choice. Two studies indicate that selectively focusing on a not most preferred
alternative indeed alters choice decisions, but only when decision involvement is low.
Study 1 further shows that this interaction effect between selective focus and involvement
takes place in the selection rather than the brand consideration stage. By introducing level
of processing next to decision involvement, Study 2 shows that the interaction effect
emerges even in limited processing conditions. The study also reconciles different
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explanations for the negative effect of selective focus on attitude-behavior consistency.
Selectively focusing on a not preferred choice option when consumers are low involved
and use limited processing seems to lead to inconsistent choices because of an increased
accessibility of the focal option, whereas selective focus on a not preferred option when
consumers are low involved and use deep processing lead to inconsistent choices because
of attitude polarization.
 Chapter IV, Looking Down is the Way Up: The Influence of the Vertical Direction of
Attention on the Evoked Processing Style, contributes to the overall aim of this
dissertation by identifying the vertical direction of attention as an effective manipulation
of the conceptual scope of attention. Specifically, four studies demonstrate that inducing
participants to look down (up) narrows (broadens) the scope of conceptual attention. As
looking down or looking up to products placed in a lower or higher vertical position is
suggested to evoke a narrower or broader processing style, this chapter demonstrates that
the vertical direction in which attention is directed instigates differences in consumers’
access to competing brands (Study 1), their categorization of brands (Studies 2 and 3),
brand choices and preference-decision correspondence (Study 4).
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 Table 1. Overview of the Experimental Studies
Chapter/Study Determinant of
Knowledge Activation
Other Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables Research Context
(Product)
Chapter II
Study 1 Motivation Brand accessibility
Brand choices
Snack bars (fictitious)
Study 2 Motivation (Two subsequent) Brand
choices
Snack bars (fictitious)
Study 3 Motivation Time lag Brand choices Snack bars (fictitious)
Chapter III
Study 1 Recency Involvement Brand consideration
Brand choice
Charities (existing)
Study 2 Recency Involvement
Depth of processing
Brand choice
Attitude change
Charities (existing)
Chapter IV
Study 1 Conceptual Scope Brand accessibility Chocolate brands
(existing)
Study 2 Conceptual Scope Brand prototypicallity
ratings
Snack bars (existing)
Study 3 Conceptual Scope Product categorization Retail items (existing)
Study 4 Conceptual Scope Brand choice Chocolate brands
(existing)
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CHAPTER II: A MOTIVATIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE QUESTION-BEHAVIOR
EFFECT2
 The question-behavior effect is about the influence of questioning people on their future
behavior on the actual, subsequent performance of that behavior. The present article outlines a
theory that sheds another light on the processes underlying the question-behavior effect.
Generally, the occurrence of the effect has been attributed to an increase in attitude accessibility,
processing fluency, or cognitive dissonance. Here, we look at intentions as motivational states.
Three studies suggest that responding to an intention question is likely to affect brand choices
through a motivational mechanism, which proposes that (1) a dynamic process of changes in the
accessibility of motivation-related and motivation-competing information in memory is enacted,
(2) the initial change in the brand choices reverses on an immediate, second brand choice
instance, and (3) the behavioral effect is persistent as the delay between the intention question
and brand choice instance increases.
2 Chapter II is currently under review as “Van Kerckhove, A., Geuens, M., and Vermeir, I. (under review – 2nd
round). A Motivational Account of the Question-Behavior Effect. Journal of Consumer Research”
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 Imagine that someone asks you about your intentions to buy a candy bar. Would merely
indicating your intention impact your future purchase behavior? This question has prompted
significant research (Dholakia 2010; Sprott et al. 2006), most of which indicates that responding
to an intention question indeed alters subsequent consumer purchases (Fitzsimons and Morwitz
1996; Morwitz, Johnson, and Schmittlein 1993). For example, consumers who completed an
intentions survey about car purchases appeared more likely to purchase a car later on (Morwitz et
al. 1993). Furthermore, respondents who did not own a car when answering the intention
question became more likely to purchase a car from a large market share brand, whereas car
owners became more likely to repurchase from the currently owned brand (Fitzsimons and
Morwitz 1996). Answering intention questions thus appears to influence purchase incidence, as
well as brand choice probabilities. This effect has been termed the question-behavior effect.
 Several theoretical explanations have been advanced for the question-behavior effect (i.e.,
cognitive dissonance, attitude accessibility, and response fluency). However, upon taking a
closer look at these different explanations, two things are striking. First, each of these theoretical
accounts proves to be a valid explanation for some of the reported findings, but none of them by
themselves or in combination with the others can explain all the previously observed effects.
Second, none of these theoretical accounts starts from the specific characteristics of intentions.
Especially the latter seems surprising as starting from the core of intentions could reveal the
missing element to more fully understand the question behavior effect. Therefore, this article
attempts to advance question-behavior research by investigating what intentions exactly instigate
on a cognitive level. Specifically, we propose that responding to an intention question may
automatically trigger the activation of an intention. Intentions are motivational states that, once
activated, guide behavior in a unique manner (Goschke and Kuhl 1993). Like other motivational
states, such as goals and needs, they are specific memorial structures that - once activated - are
characterized by a distinct accessibility pattern. Information related to an intention remains in a
relatively heightened state of activation for as long as the intention is active (Goschke and Kuhl
1993). After the intended action has been completed though, intention-related information
becomes temporarily inhibited (Marsh, Hicks, and Bink 1998). Such changes in the activation of
information in memory, may subsequently affect the likelihood of implementing an intention
(Chapman 2001).
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 This article posits that taking a motivational perspective can have an important contribution
for explaining why the simple act of answering an intention question actually causes such
significant behavioral changes. We argue that merely responding to an intention question may
activate an intention. The activation of a motivational state such as goals and intentions is
characterized by three main principles: (1) intention-related stimuli increase in accessibility and
intention-competing stimuli become less accessible; (2) these changes in relative accessibility
persist until the intention is completed; and (3) intention completion temporarily inhibits
intention-related stimuli and intention-competing stimuli no longer experience inhibition. A first
study shows that answering an intention question leads to differences in the accessibility of the
most preferred brand and its closest competitor. These changes in brand accessibilities are in line
with the first and third principle that characterize motivational states. The study also shows that these
changes in brand accessibility are driving the question-behavior effect. As some of these results can
also be explained by other theoretical accounts, a second study takes the question behavior effect
to a new context and demonstrates how it develops in a sequential choice setting. Unlike existing
explanations, the third principle of the motivational perspective suggests that responding to an
intention question leads to an initial increase in the likelihood of choosing for the most preferred
brand, followed by a reversal on a subsequent choice occasion. A sequential choice context thus
provided an ideal setting to more firmly establish the validity of a motivational perspective as an
alternative account of the question-behavior effect. A final experiment investigates the role of
time lags between the intention question and the initial brand choice and between the two
consecutive brand choices. The results are in line with the second principle of motivational
states. Together these studies provide evidence for our central proposition that merely answering
an intention question activates an intention.
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
 1.1 The Question-behavior Effect
 The question-behavior effect entails the finding that questioning people on their future
behavior influences their likelihood of actually engaging in the behavior (Dholakia 2010;
Sherman 1980; Sprott et al. 2006). For instance, Williams, Fitzsimons, and Block (2004)
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demonstrated an increase in flossing behavior and a decrease in the consumption of fatty foods
following an intention question. The occurrence of the effect has been investigated in both
laboratory (Fitzsimons and Williams 2000; Levav and Fitzsimons 2006) and field settings
(Chandon, Morwitz, and Reinartz 2004, 2005; Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, and Young 1987;
Obermiller and Spangenberg 2000). It has also been shown in a wide variety of situations,
including socially desirable (e.g., recycling) and undesirable (e.g., cheating) behaviors, and for
purchases in various product categories, both durable and nondurable (Chandon, Morwitz, and
Reinartz 2004; Morwitz et al. 1993).
 Concerning the underlying mechanism, the three most popular processes that have been
empirically shown to contribute to the occurrence of the question-behavior effect are (1) attitude
accessibility (Morwitz and Fitzsimons 2004), (2) cognitive dissonance (Spangenberg et al. 2003),
and (3) response fluency (Janiszewski and Chandon 2007). The attitude accessibility account
holds that answering intention questions makes the underlying attitudes towards the target
behavior more accessible, which results in a change in the performance of the target behavior in
line with the valence of the attitude that became more accessible (Morwitz and Fitzsimons 2004;
Fitzsimons and Moore 2008). That is, answering an intention question increases the likelihood
that positive, accessible choice options are chosen whereas it decreases the choice likelihood of
negative, accessible choice options. The cognitive dissonance account posits that when asked to
predict future behavior, cognitions on past behavior and social norms come to mind and may
evoke a feeling of dissonance (e.g., ‘I should spend more time with my family, I have promised
them, but I worked overtime almost every day the past week’). Alleviating this feeling of
dissonance then may become a motivating force to align future behavior with social norms
(Spangenberg et al. 2003). Empirical evidence suggests that question-behavior effects are also
sensitive to response fluency. Janiszewski and Chandon (2007) show that the cognitive processes
that generate a response to an intention question may overlap with the processes associated with
deciding whether to engage in a behavior (e.g., ‘do you plan to buy brand x’ and deciding to
purchase brand x). This overlap in cognitive processes may create a fluency experience that
supports the behavioral tendency, such that the intended behavior becomes more likely to be
enacted.
 In sum, there is ample evidence that measuring intentions can change consumers’ purchase
behavior. Researchers have also provided valid explanations for the reported findings.
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Nevertheless, despite the appeal of these explanations, at least two elements suggest an
investigation of additional processes that contribute to the question-behavior effect is useful.
 First, each of the existing explanations is able to account for some of the previously reported
question-behavior findings, but none of the existing theoretical accounts can explain all of the
results. For example, responding to an intention question leads to a stronger question-behavior
effect than responding to an attitude question (Chapman 2001; Spangenberg et al. 2003;
Janiszewski and Chandon 2007). Inasmuch that responding to an intention question does not
make an attitude more accessible than responding to an attitude question (Chapman 2001),
attitude accessibility cannot account for the incremental effect of responding to intention
questions (Janiszewski and Chandon 2007). Cognitive dissonance (Spangenberg 1997;
Spangenberg and Greenwald 1999; Spangenberg et al. 2003) operates especially in the domain of
socially desirable behaviors. When the questioned behavior does not refer to a socially desirable
act, not behaving in line with the predicted behavior is not likely to evoke a feeling of
dissonance. Finally, response fluency-driven question-behavior effects are limited to infrequent
or novel acts for which respondents possess little substantive information (Janiszewski and
Chandon 2007). Indeed, Janiszewski and Chandon (2007, Study 5) showed that the fluency-
driven question-behavior effect is mitigated when respondents can rely on diagnostic brand
information. Because all of the current theoretical explanations are valid explanations in specific
situations, but none of them can account in itself for all the reported question-behavior findings,
researchers have suggested considering them as complementary (Spangenberg, Greenwald, and
Sprott 2008). However, even if the different theoretical explanations are combined,  the
previously discussed shortcomings of these theoretical accounts leave at least one type of
question-behavior effects unexplained: behavior changes occurring after responding to an
intention question related to products that fall outside the domain of socially desirable products
in case that people are considering attribute information. This caveat in question-behavior
findings explained by existing accounts provides a first reason to look for an additional
explanation for the question-behavior effect.
 Second and most importantly, the basic premise for a question-behavior effect to occur is
responding to an intention question. Sherman (1980) stated that when responding to an intention
question people project themselves into a future situation and make a statement about what their
behavior would be in that situation. Generally, this projection of one’s behavior in a hypothetical
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future situation should be an important input for and determinant of later actual behavior
(Sherman 1980). Indeed, if thinking about future behavior would be irrelevant when performing
the actual behavior, there would not be a good reason to foreshadow (Papies, Aarts and de Vries
2009). In general, intentions do transform into actions (Sheeran and Abraham 2003). However,
intentions can impact future behavior only if they are accessible in memory at the time an
adequate opportunity for their execution occurs (Goschke and Kuhl 1993). This indicates the
importance of focusing upon how the accessibility of intention-related concepts is affected by
responding to an intention question in providing an explanation for the question-behavior effect.
Surprisingly, this fundamental element is only partly incorporated in prior accounts of the
question-behavior effect.
 To partly fill this gap, this article adopts a motivational framework and considers the
question-behavior effect as the outcome of the activation of an intention. More specifically, this
article demonstrates the importance of the motivational properties that characterize intentions in
the context of the question-behavior effect.
 1.2 Motivational Consequences of Responding to an Intention Question
 Like goals, intentions are stored in memory as motivational states. Whereas goals can be
described as desirable states people try to attain or undesirable states that they try to avoid
(Baumgartner and Pieters 2008; Custers and Aarts 2005; Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, and Aarts
2007), intentions refer to the specific ways in which a desired state can be accomplished or an
undesired state can be avoided. Intentions are the behavioral tendencies one commits to during
goal pursuit. Kuhl (1987) describes an intention as “an activated plan to which an actor
committed herself or himself” (p. 282). When forming an intention, one commits to performing a
certain action. Little is known, however, about how consumer intentions actually come to be
selected and pursued (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008).
Research on goal activation has indicated that the activation of a goal can occur unconsciously as
well as consciously. Even the mere presence of certain goal cues in the environment can
successfully establish goal activation. Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner (2008), for example,
showed that merely being exposed to prestigious (e.g., Tiffany) or low cost retail brands (e.g.,
Dollar Store) may unconsciously activate a prestige or thrift goal.
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 According to Bargh (1990), once a goal is activated, the action associated with that goal
should become activated as well and direct subsequent behavior. For example, Aarts and
Dijksterhuis (2000) found that the activation of a goal (e.g., the travel goal ‘going to the
university’) led to the activation of the specific behaviors previously performed to attain the goal
(e.g., ‘take the bus’). Besides activation through goal setting, the direct activation of a specific
intended behavior is also a possibility, which in turn might lead to the activation of a related goal
(Bayuk, Janiszewski, and Leboeuf 2010; Kruglanski et al. 2002). An example would be priming
Lipton Ice tea which could activate the goal of quenching one’s thirst (Karremans, Stroebe and
Klaus 2006). Along this line, the present research proposes that responding to an intention
question is a subtle manipulation that may engender the activation of an intention. Answering a
seemingly innocuous intention question may activate the representation of this intention in
memory. In the next section, we discuss what the consequences are of activating intentions.
 1.3 Accessibility Principles of Motivational Constructs in Memory
 The activation of motivational states, such as goals and intentions, is traditionally
accompanied by changes in the cognitive set-up that is supportive of the intended behavior
(Higgins and King 1981). Several principles characterize the accessibility arising from these
motivational states. First, intention-relevant information is likely to be highly activated in order
to enable an individual to transform an intention into action. Accordingly, Goschke and Kuhl
(1993) demonstrate an increased accessibility of words as coffee, table and spoon when an
intention to set the table was formed. In an investigation of whether this relative increase in
accessibility stems from a true increase in the activation of intention-related concepts, or from a
decreased activation of competing concepts, research has shown that both processes are likely to
be at work. Besides facilitating the retrieval of intention-related information, activating an
intention is also likely to inhibit the retrieval of information related to competing intentions
(Veling and Van Knippenberg 2008).
 Hence, research suggests inhibitor links exist between competing goals or between
competing intentions (Kruglanski et al. 2002). Both abstract goals and concrete intentions require
shielding from competing motivational states in order to complete them (Gollwitzer 1999). For
instance, Bayuk, Janiszewski, and LeBoeuf (2010) demonstrate that adopting a plan (e.g., eat
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less eggs to reduce cholesterol) encourages the execution of the plan, while it discourages the
execution of alternative, out-of-plan behaviors (e.g., also exercise more to reduce cholesterol).
Veling and Van Knippenberg (2008) show that information that is competing with intentions
gets inhibited. For example, participants who intend to respond to certain exemplars of a
category (e.g., fruits: peach, melon, and strawberry) inhibit other exemplars of that category
(e.g., grape, plum, and orange) but not unrelated stimuli (e.g., animals: elephant, rabbit, and lion)
(Veling and Van Knippenberg, 2006). In sum, a first principle that characterizes the activation of
an intention is the relative activation of intention-related information and the relative inhibition
of information related to competing intentions.
 A second principle that characterizes the accessibility of motivational constructs is that the
activation is persistent. The increased level of activation of intention-related, relative to
competing and neutral information is suggested to persist until the intention is discarded or
enacted upon. Hence, other than accessibility resulting from a recent activation, motivation-
induced accessibility persists as long as the motivational state is active (Goschke and Kuhl 1993;
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trotchel 2001). For example, Goschke and Kuhl
(1993) investigated the time course of the activation of intention-related memory representations
with an interval of approximately 15 minutes between the formation of an intention and its
execution. Intention-related concepts, as opposed to equally well-learned neutral concepts, were
recognized faster when latencies were measured over a 15-minute interval. In a similar vein,
Bargh et al. (2001) showed that activation of an achievement goal increased performance on an
anagram task. Performance facilitation appeared to be more pronounced after a delay of 5
minutes compared to immediate performance facilitation. In sum, the second principle
concerning intention activation entails that the increased activation of intention-related
information is likely to persist or even strengthen in time.
 Finally, a third principle that distinguishes the accessibility of motivational constructs as
compared to the activation of other constructs is that motivation-related information becomes
inhibited upon fulfillment of the motivational state (Liberman and Förster 2000; Marsh, Hicks,
and Bink 1998; Marsh, Hicks, and Bryan 1999; Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 2005). For
example, when a person sets an intention to purchase the latest CD released by his or her favorite
band, then the concept of this CD should become accessible and remain accessible until this CD
is bought. Actually purchasing this CD completes the intention, and by the logic of post-
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fulfillment inhibition, will reduce the accessibility of the concept of this CD. Once an active
motivation is achieved, that motivation should decrease in strength. (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and
Tanner 2008). This finding of post-fulfillment inhibition is uniquely related to motivational
constructs, as accessibilities resulting from a recent activation would predict increased
accessibility after purchasing the CD because completing an intention usually involves
processing constructs related to the intention (Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005). Traditional
accessibility theories predict increased accessibility of relevant concepts as attention is brought
to them through achievement. This distinction can be referred to as the satiation criterion
(Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008).
 This post-goal fulfillment inhibition can be seen as functional in light of the performance of
the next task at hand. Constructs that are related to a completed intention are often irrelevant and
could potentially interfere with the next task. Hence, when multiple actions need to be performed
consecutively, post-fulfillment inhibition may occur to facilitate the completion of the next
intention in line. For instance, when planning to first purchase a CD followed by the purchase of
a new shirt, constructs related to the purchase of the CD are likely to be inhibited in order to
facilitate the purchase of a new shirt. In this situation post-fulfillment inhibition may be seen as
functional, and therefore persistent, up until completion of the second intended action (Li,
Lindenberger, Rünger, and Frensch 2000). However, consumers often do not have to perform a
second task when a first intention is completed. In this situation, constructs relating to the initial
task are not likely to interfere with a subsequent, unrelated task. Therefore, inhibition of these
constructs is not necessary, unless to avoid a repetition of the completed intention (Marsh, Hicks,
and Bink, 1998). In this situation, post-choice inhibition is likely to rapidly decay over time
rather than being persistent (Marsh, Hicks, and Bryan 1999). In addition, competing information
is likely to lose its inhibitory status upon satiation of the active motivational state (Veling and
Van Knippenberg 2008). So, to conclude, the third principle that characterizes the activation of a
motivational state is that motivation-related information becomes inhibited as soon as the
intention is completed.
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 1.4 The Operation of Motivation Induced Accessibility in the Question-behavior Effect
 This paper posits that the operation of the question-behavior effect might reflect the
activation of an intention and the cognitive features typically associated with motivational states.
As described in the previous section, the activation of motivational states entails three main
principles: (1a) Intention-related stimuli are relatively more accessible than neutral stimuli,
whereas (1b) intention-competing stimuli are relatively less accessible than neutral stimuli prior
to intention completion (i.e., prior to posing the intended behavior); (2) this relative accessibility
advantage of intention-related stimuli is persistent in time up until the moment of intention
completion; and (3a) after intention completion, intention-related stimuli become relatively less
accessible than neutral stimuli, whereas (3b) intention-competing stimuli no longer experience
inhibition.
 Translating these activation principles to a consumer purchase setting in which we can
investigate the question-behavior effect, immediately raises the question which brands can be
considered as intention-related and which ones as intention-competing. We argue that the most
preferred brand is most likely to get an intention-related status, whereas competing brands, that is
other well-liked brands, are expected to be flagged as intention-competing. Indeed, with respect
to the former, Davis and Warshaw (1991) showed that people are most likely to form a specific
intention targeted at their most preferred option when responding to an intention question in
which no reference is made to a specific option. In addition, with respect to the latter,  Veling
and Van Knippenberg (2008) suggest that only well-preferred, competing brands are likely to be
inhibited because the degree to which a brand is inhibited depends on the degree to which the
brand detracts attention from the intention-related brand. The level of competition is likely to
depend on a brand’s position in the preference ranking.
 The foregoing leads us to propose that, upon answering an intention question, the most
preferred brand becomes more accessible, while other well-preferred brands become less
accessible. This increased activation of the most preferred brand is likely to persist when the time
lag between the intention question and the choice situation is extended. After making a brand
choice, the most preferred brand is likely to be temporarily inhibited, while previously inhibited
competing brands are likely to retrieve their neutral level of activation. As accessibility has
frequently been shown to have a pervasive influence on consumer behavior (Nedungadi,
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Chattopadhyay, and Muthukrishnan 2001; Thelen and Woodside 1997), these changes in relative
brand activation are likely to translate in brand choices. Consequently, we expect a question-
behavior effect that unfolds as follows: responding to an intention question is likely to increase
the choice for the most preferred brand. However, this relative advantage of the most preferred
brand as compared to its competing brands reverses in case consumers have to make an
immediate, subsequent choice.
2. RESEARCH OVERVIEW
 Three studies are set up to illustrate the added value of adopting a motivational perspective to
explain question-behavior findings by showing that the question-behavior effect develops in line
with predictions that are based on the unique accessibility principles that are associated with the
activation of motivational states. The main objective of study 1 is to demonstrate how
responding to an intention question at first increases the accessibility of the most preferred brand
(principle 1a), but inhibits other well-preferred brands (principle 1b). However, after making a
brand choice, this pattern changes into inhibition of the most preferred brand (principle 3a), and
neutral activation of the other well-preferred brands (principle 3b). A second objective of the
study is to illustrate by means of a mediation analysis that these differential brand accessibilities
indeed drive the changes in brand choice caused by answering an intention question. Although
an increased activation of the most preferred brand could also be explained by the attitude
accessibility account, the inhibition of other well-preferred brands before brand choice and of the
most preferred brand after brand choice cannot. Neither could they be explained by response
fluency or cognitive dissonance. Therefore, this study intends to already provide initial support
for the added value of taking a motivational perspective on answering intention questions.
 Study 2 tries to corroborate the findings of study 1 – that is, the accessibility advantage of the
intention-related brand (i.e., the most preferred brand) prior to an initial choice and the
subsequent accessibility deficit of this brand affecting subsequent brand choice - in a different
setting. More specifically, we investigate what the impact is of answering an intention question,
not only on the subsequent brand choice, but also on an immediate second brand choice. How
responding to an intention question alters downstream brand choice behavior has not been
addressed in prior research. Consequently, empirical studies documenting the validity of the
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existing explanations for the question-behavior effect have only focused on initial rather than
subsequent brand choices. Chandon et al. (2004) suggested that question-behavior effects were
unlikely to affect future purchases beyond the initial purchase. Only a carryover of the initial
purchase to a subsequent purchase was anticipated. In contrast, if the question-behavior effect
reflects the motivational nature of intentions and their associated cognitive features, then the
influence of responding to an intention question is not likely to be limited to the initial choice
situation. Specifically, answering an intention question is expected to increase the choice for the
most preferred brand at an initial choice instance, while a decreased choice for this brand at a
second choice instance may be anticipated. Consequently, addressing how the question-behavior
effect operates in a sequential brand choice setting provides an excellent test case to demonstrate
the value of an additional explanation for the question-behavior effect.
 Whereas study 1 and study 2 focus on finding evidence for principles 1 and 3 in two different
contexts, the objective of study 3 is to investigate the proposed motivational account for the
question-behavior effect by addressing the persistence of the effect over time (principle 2).  To
this end, we manipulate the time delay between the intention question and the initial and
subsequent brand choice. Persistence in effect sizes as time intervals increase are generally
ascribed to motivational sources (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trotchel 2001;
Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008).
3. STUDY 1
 The objective of study 1 is twofold. The first and most important objective is to provide
initial evidence for a motivational account of the question-behavior effect by showing that
responding to an intention question  results in increased activation of the most preferred brand
prior to decision making (principle 1a), but decreased activation after decision making (principle
3a). A motivational perspective on answering intention questions also predicts that competing
brands will be inhibited before brand choice (principle 1b), but return to a neutral activation level
after brand choice (principle 3b). To test these hypotheses, we use a setting in which respondents
first answer either an intention question or an attitude question, and next make a brand choice.
The attitude question condition serves as a control condition. We choose for an attitude question
in the control condition (instead of having another question or no question), because showing
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that the expected changes in activation and inhibition occur after answering an intention
question, but not after answering an attitude question delivers even more convincing evidence
than when we would compare it to a “no question” condition. Indeed, asking an attitude question
has been suggested to provide a stringent test-case for the question-behavior effect before
(Chapman, 2001).
 This study employs a choice set including five brands. A pretest is used to find out how many
of these brands are on average preferred and how many are on average included in the
participants’ consideration set. Brands that are preferred can be considered as competing with the
most preferred brand. Only for these brands we expect that answering an intention question will
lead to inhibition.
 A second objective is to provide evidence that the changes in brand activation, instigated by
responding to an intention measure, drive the mere measurement effect. By means of a mediation
analysis, we show that these relative differences in brand activation– as measured by a response
latency task - between the most preferred and competing brands indeed are responsible for the
behavioral effects of responding to an intention question. Veling and Van Knippenberg (2006)
show that facilitating and inhibitory effects do not necessarily occur independently. Intention-
related stimuli can be in a heightened state of activation, potentially interfering stimuli may be in
a lowered state of activation, or a combination may take place. The key element is the relative
difference between intention-related stimuli and potentially interfering stimuli. To establish that
differences in brand activation serve as a mediator between brand choices, pre-choice brand
accessibilities and brand choices are measured within-subjects. The experiment includes an
additional condition, in which the brand accessibilities are not measured prior to brand choices.
The reason for including this condition is that such an experimental set-up allows to assess
whether measuring brand accessibility a priori distorts subsequent brand choices.
 3.1 Pretest
 A pretest (27 students, 11 women) investigated the fictitious brands and their attributes to
identify the number of preferred alternatives included in the choice set. In this pretest, the
participants first received the attribute information of the five brands (see table 1), then they were
instructed to rank order the presented brands according to their preferences.
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 Table 1. Attribute Scores for the Brands Used in Study 1
Brand Name Taste Grams of fat Calories Shelf life
Mauna Loa 8 4.8 350 100
Skor 7.5 11.0 340 110
Granola 7 7.0 335 105
Abba Zaba 10 8.0 350 105
Mamba 9 6.6 345 100
 Next, they were asked to indicate which brands they would actually consider purchasing.
Hence, they were asked to report their consideration set. Finally, they responded to two items
designed to assess the number of brands (and which brands) they judged as more direct
competitors. Specifically, the number of competing brands was identified with two items: “If I
was intending to choose [name of the most preferred brand], there is/are ___ (fill in a number)
brand(s) that could make me doubt whether to purchase [name of the most preferred brand]” and
“If I was to make a purchase decision for one of the five candy bar brands, it would come down
to a choice between ___ (fill in a number) of the brands I prefer.” Each item was followed by a
request to indicate the brands that matched the query.
 The results of this pretest demonstrate the following mean preference ranking of the
participants for five candy bars: Abba Zaba (M = 1.41, SD = .89), Mamba (M = 1.93, SD = .47),
Mauna Loa (M = 2.89, SD = .64), Skor (M = 4.33, SD = .55), and Granola (M = 4.44, SD = .89).
The mean number of brands in the consideration set is 1.78 (SD = .69). Based on this we can
assume that one brand competes with the most preferred brand. Averaging the responses to the
two items designed to determine the number of competing brands more directly also indicates
that most participants view only the second most preferred brand as a competing brand
(MNumber_competing= 1.18, SD = .62). Thus the pretest measures consistently indicate that only the
second most preferred brand in this assortment is likely to be a competitor and thus experience
inhibition.
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 3.2 Participants and Design
 In total, 179 students (70 men, 109 women), aged between 18 and 29 years (MAge = 22.41,
SD = 3.39), participated in a 2 ´ 2 between-subjects experiment. As a first factor we manipulated
whether the participants responded to an intention or attitude question. The participants in the
intention condition responded to a category-level intention question (“How likely or unlikely
would you be to try the presented candy bars if they were available to you?”) on a seven-point
Likert scale with endpoints of -3 (“very unlikely”) and +3 (“very likely”). A category-level
intention question was used as this type of question is most likely to activate only an intention
targeted at the most preferred brand, rather than activating multiple intentions targeted at
different brands (Davis and Warshaw 1991). This set-up, in which no explicit reference is made
to one specific option in the intention question, facilitates the prediction of which intention will
become activated, namely an intention for the most preferred brand. The participants in the
attitude condition served as the control group and answered one attitude question (“How positive
or negative are you about the presented candy bars becoming available to you?”), also on a
seven-point Likert scale with endpoints of -3 (“very negative”) and +3 (“very positive”). The
attitude question in the control condition ensured that these participants paid equal attention to
the product category as did participants in the intention condition. Consequently, any differences
between the two conditions (intention versus attitude question) cannot be attributed to a
differential attention to the product category.
 The conditions also varied in the measured dependent variables, such that half the
participants first completed a response latency task, then made a choice decision, and next
completed a second response latency task. The other half of the participants made a brand choice
and next completed a response latency task. So, in contrast to the former respondents, they
completed only one response latency task. The data gathered from the first group of participants
provide the input for the mediation analysis, whereas those from the second group provide
verification of whether measuring brand latencies prior to the choice task affects that choice task.
If no differences between these two groups emerge, we can confidently assume that measuring
brand latencies before respondents make a choice does not distort this brand choice.
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 3.3 Procedure
 Participants first considered attribute information (on the attributes taste, grams of fat,
calories and shelf life) about the five unknown brands of candy bars (as was the case in the
pretest). Also these participants were told that the candy bars were available in a neighboring
country and that the manufacturer was thinking of introducing them in the domestic market.
Next, participants reported their relative attitudes toward the presented brands by rank ordering
them from least to most preferred. Subsequently, half the participants answered an intention
question, and the other half answered an attitude question. After they completed several filler
questions, half the participants responded to a choice task that indicated the manufacturer would
distribute samples of candy bars to participants, and to enter to win, respondents had to fill in the
name of the brand they would prefer to receive. The other half completed a response latency task
after the filler questions and before making a choice decision. For both groups of participants the
experiment concluded with a response latency task, immediately following respondents’ choice
decision. The response latency task served as a measure of the brand accessibilities. To assess
response latencies, the names of the five target brands, five existing candy bar brands and ten
brands from other product categories appeared, one by one, on a computer monitor in random
order. In this product category identification task, participants were instructed to press a button
labeled “snack bar” for brands of snack bars or a button labeled “non-snack bar” for other
products.
 3.4 Results
 The analysis of the choices made by participants who did not complete a response latency
task indicates a question-behavior effect. Significantly more participants who answered an
intention versus an attitude question chose their most preferred brand (76.4% vs. 56.8%, ?²(92) =
3.94, p = .047)3. A similar difference emerged in the choice share of the most preferred brand
when participants completed a response latency task before making a choice (82.1% vs. 62.5%,
?²(87) = 4.02, p = .045). That is, a comparable number of participants opted for the most
3 All ?² values reported throughout the empirical chapters refer to Pearson ?² values, unless explicitly stated
differently.
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preferred brand after responding to an intention question, whether they completed a response
latency task first or not (82.1% vs. 76.4%, ?²(94) = .44, p = .507)4 (see table 2).
 Table 2. Overview of Brand Choices by Condition in Study 1
Type of
question
Measured
pre-choice
accessibility
N Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5
Attitude No 37 56.8% 21.6% 8.1% 8.1% 5.4%
Intention No 55 76.4% 16.4% 3.6% 1.8% 1.8%
Attitude Yes 48 62.5% 16.7% 6.3% 8.3% 6.3%
Intention Yes 39 82.1% 5.1% 2.6% 2.6% 7.7%
 The pattern of brand accessibilities prior to decision making matches the expectations based
on a motivational perspective (See figure 1 panel A). Contrast analyses confirm increased
activation (i.e., lower mean response latencies) of the most preferred brand compared with less
preferred brands prior to decision making in the intention question condition (t(82) = -3.04, p =
.003), but not in the attitude question condition (t(82) = 1.12, p = .267). The difference observed
in the intention question condition remains when we compare the accessibility of the most
preferred choice option with the second most preferred choice option (t(83) = -3.74, p < .001).
Again this difference does not emerge in the attitude question condition (t(83) = 1.24, p = .219).
These findings provide support for principle 1a of motivational states. In addition, as predicted
by principal 1b, the second most preferred brand is inhibited compared with other less preferred
brands when participants answered an intention question (t(83) = 2.20, p = .030), but not when
they answered an attitude question (t(83) = -.47, p = .641).
4 These results indicate that measuring brand latencies before respondents make a choice does not distort this brand
choice. The inclusion of an additional condition in which brand accessibilities are not measured prior to brand
choices, however, does not allow assessing how measuring brand accessibilities distorts these brand accessibilities.
Yet, it is a straightforward prediction that measuring brand accessibilities influences brand accessibilities. Possibly,
measuring brand accessibilities made each brand somewhat more accessible, by which the relative difference in
brand accessibilities remained intact and, hence, brand choices were not distorted.
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 Further, brand accessibility analyses also lend support to principle 3a, which suggests
inhibition of intention-related information after intention completion (See figure 1 panel B).
Contrast analyses confirm longer latencies for the most preferred brand compared to less
preferred brands after decision making in the intention question condition (t(171) = 2.14, p =
.034), whereas no significant difference in the accessibility of the most preferred brand,
compared to less preferred brands, could be detected in the attitude question condition (t(171) =
-.82, p = .41). The second most preferred brand, which experienced inhibition prior to decision
making in the intention question condition, has a post-choice activation level comparable to that
of less preferred brands (t(171) =  -.01, p = .990), providing support for principle 3b. In the
attitude question condition, the second most preferred brand remains at an activation level
comparable to that of less preferred brands after a choice decision was made (t(171) =  -.65, p =
.517).
 Finally, if changes in brand accessibilities underlie the question-behavior effect, then the
activation of the most preferred brand, relative to the second most preferred brand, prior to
choice should mediate the effect of responding to an intention question on the choice of the most
preferred brand5. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), this study used a simultaneous logistic
regression of brand choice on the type of question and the relative activation of the most
preferred brand. The introduction of relative activation in the logistic regression analysis that
predicts choice according to the type of question reduces the effect of the type of question from
significant (? = 1.01, t(85) = 1.96, p = .053) to insignificant (? = .52, t(85) = .94, p = .348), and
the relative activation of the most preferred brand becomes a significant predictor (? = 1.57, t(85)
= 2.50, p = .015). The overall significance of this indirect effect can be assessed with a
bootstrapping mediation test (Preacher and Hayes 2004; Shrout and Bolger 2002).  The bootstrap
estimate of this indirect effect and the constructed 95% confidence interval (lower bound 95% CI
= .174, upper bound 95% CI = 1.44) show that 0 is not in the 95% confidence interval, so the
indirect effect is significant, in further support of successful mediation.
5 The relative difference between the most preferred and second most preferred brand was operationalized as the
subtraction of both measures. Similar results were obtained for the mediation analysis when defining the relative
difference either as the ratio of both measures, or as the ratio of the subtraction and sum addition of both measures.
The bootstrap estimate for the former indirect effect, and the constructed 95% confidence interval, show that 0 is not
in the 95% confidence interval (lower bound 95% CI = .199, upper bound 95% CI = 1.635). The bootstrap estimate
for the latter indirect effect, and the constructed 95% confidence interval, show that 0 is not in the 95% confidence
interval (lower bound 95% CI = .180, upper bound 95% CI = 1.505).
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Figure 1. Mean Pre-choice and Post-Choice Log-transformed Response Latencies for the Five Brands, Rank Ordered from the
Most to Least Preferred
Panel A: Pre-choice Brand Accessibilities
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Panel B: Post-choice Brand Accessibilities
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3.5 Discussion
 The results of study 1 provide initial evidence for the proposed motivational account.
Activated intentions tend to be associated with changes in the accessibility of options which
influence subsequent brand choices. Study 1 demonstrates that measuring category-level
intentions indeed affects brand accessibilities that in turn affect brand choices. Dynamic changes
in brand accessibilities occur after responses to a category-level intention measure, in line with a
motivational account. The reported findings establish the motivational nature of the question-
behavior effect by demonstrating that motivation-related concepts are inhibited upon satiation of
the motivation. This inhibition is specifically related to a motivational account and cannot be
accounted for by other, existing theoretical accounts of the question-behavior effect. To further
demonstrate the usefulness of a motivational account, the following study focuses on the
inhibition of intention-related cognitions after completing an intention (principle 3), and shows
that this principle as well holds implications for brand choices.
4. STUDY 2
 The main aim of study 2 is to take the question behavior effect one step further. The question
behavior effect has traditionally been investigated as the impact of answering an intention
question on a subsequent purchase decision. Study 2 goes one step further and investigates how
the question-behavior effect unfolds when two brands are chosen consecutively from a choice
set. That is, this study looks into what happens if consumers first answer an intention question,
subsequently make a choice decision, and immediately after make a second choice decision in
the same product category. In line with previous records of the question-behavior effect,
responding to an intention question is likely to affect the choice share of the most preferred brand
in the first choice instance. But, what will happen in the second choice decision?
 Traditional theoretical accounts would expect the same effect on the second choice decision
as on the first choice decision. Indeed, having chosen for a certain brand in the first choice
decision makes this brand highly accessible and would therefore be most likely to be chosen
again in the second choice decision according to the attitude accessibility account. Response
fluency would also be highest for the brand chosen in the first choice instance, making this
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choice option most likely in the second choice instance according to response fluency. And for
these situations in which cognitive dissonance applies, it can also be expected that if a consumer
chooses for a certain option in the first choice option because this option is most congruent with
social norms, he or she would choose for the same option again in the second choice option.
 In contrast, relying on principle 3a, a motivational perspective would predict a reduced
likelihood of choosing again for the most preferred brand in the second choice instance.
According to principle 3a, accessibility of intention-related information is actively reduced upon
intention completion (Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 2005; Liberman and Förster 2000; Marsh,
Hicks, and Bink 1998; Marsh, Hicks, and Bryan 1999). This reduced accessibility of intention-
related information, or in other words the reduced accessibility of the most preferred brand, can
be expected to result in a reduced choice likelihood of this choice option in the second choice
instance. Demonstrating the role of post-fulfillment inhibition in the question-behavior effect
further confirms the importance of relying on a motivational perspective in addition to other
theoretical accounts of the question-behavior effect.
 4.1 Participants and Design
 One hundred and twenty-nine university students (MAge = 20.91) participated in this study
and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. To investigate whether answering an
intention question affects the pattern of brand choices, the participants in the experimental
condition responded to an intention question (“How likely or unlikely would you be to try the
presented candy bars if they were available to you?”) whereas those in the control condition
either responded to an attitude question (“How positive or negative are you about the presented
candy bars becoming available to you?”) or did not respond to a replacing question. Hence, the
brand choices in the experimental condition are compared to the brand choices in two control
conditions including respectively an attitude question or no control question. Unlike the first
study which investigated a traditional question behavior setting, this study uses a new setting,
namely a sequential choice setting. For traditional settings, including the most stringent case
(namely comparing an intention question to an attitude question) is sufficient because the
comparison with a “no question” control condition has already been frequently reported
(Janiszewski and Chandon, 2007; Morwitz and Fitzsimons, 2004). For a new setting such as the
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current one, we thought it would be good to compare the results of an intention question (1) to a
baseline condition (i.e., the no question condition) in order to get an idea of the size of the effect,
and (2) to a stringent condition (i.e., the attitude question condition) to get an idea of the relative
size of the effect.
 4.2 Procedure
 As in study 1, participants reviewed the ratings of five brands of unknown candy bars on four
attributes (i.e., taste, grams of fat, calories and shelf life). Participants rank ordered the brands
according to their preferences. Next, the participants were told that these candy bars were
available in a neighboring country and that the manufacturer was thinking of introducing them
on the domestic market. The experimental manipulation then ensured that participants responded
to a category-level intention question, an attitude question or no additional question. After
completing a filler task, the participants were informed that the manufacturer intended to
distribute samples of candy bars to the participants. Participants then made a decision by clicking
the brand of their choice. After making a first choice decision, they were told that the winners of
a box of candy bars could receive two boxes. Therefore, on the next page, they clicked the brand
of their choice for the second box of candy bars. The experiment explicitly stated that they were
completely free to choose whatever brand they desired, including the previously chosen brand if
they wished. Thus, all five brands were depicted as available choice options in this second choice
instance.
 4.3 Results and Discussion
 The students who participated in this study made two separate choice decisions (see table 3).
A separate ?² analysis for the first choice decision indicates that participants who responded to an
intention question are more likely to select their most preferred choice option than are
participants in the control condition consisting of an attitude question (80.5% vs. 54.8%, ?²(83) =
6.256, p = .012), and in the control condition not including an additional question (80.5% vs.
45.7%, ?²(87) = 11.174, p = .001). This difference is in line with the predictions based on a
motivational perspective. For the second choice decision, a reversed pattern emerges:
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Participants who responded to an intention question are now significantly less likely to select the
most preferred brand than participants in the control condition consisting of an attitude question
(14.6% vs. 33.3%, ?²(83) = 3.966, p = .046), or in the control condition not including an
additional question (14.6% vs. 30.4%, ?²(87) = 3.057, p = .080).
 It could be argued though that this difference between conditions might not be caused by
differences in motivational states, but rather reflect a logical consequence of the differences
between the conditions in the initial choice decision. To exclude this alternative explanation, a
further investigation focuses on the choice share of the most preferred brand in the second choice
instance, conditional on the choice of this brand in the first choice instance. These analyses
reveal a significant difference between the experimental and control conditions. Whereas 52.2%
of the participants in the control condition including an attitude question, and 47.6 % of the
participants in the control condition not including an additional question, choosing the most
preferred brand in the first instance select this brand again in the second instance, only 18.2% do
so in the experimental condition consisting of an intention question (?²(56) = 7.180, p = .007;
?²(54) = 5.334, p = .021).
 Table 3. Overview of Brand Choices by Condition in Study 2
Subsequent Brand ChoiceType of
Question
N Initial Brand
Choice Unconditional Conditional
No Question 46 45.7% 30.4% 47.6%
Attitude 42 54.8% 33.3% 52.2%
Intention 41 80.5% 14.6% 18.2%
 The results of this second study demonstrate that there is more to the question behavior effect
than only an effect on a first choice decision. More importantly, these results also indicate the
deficit of existing theoretical accounts, either combined or in isolation, to explain such an effect.
Answering an intention question initially increases the choice for the most preferred, intention-
related brand, but in second instance, it decreases the choice for the most preferred brand. This
brand choice pattern is in line with the predictions based on a motivational perspective on
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responding to intention questions, but run counter to the predictions based on other theoretical
accounts of the question-behavior effect. In sum, this second study provides further evidence of
the usefulness of incorporating a motivational perspective next to the existing explanations to
account for the question-behavior effect.
5. STUDY 3
 The purpose of study 3 is to replicate the findings of study 2 and provide further support for
our motivational account. Manipulating the time interval between the intention question and the
initial brand choice, and between the initial and subsequent brand choice, enables us to further
establish the motivational nature of the results of study 2. Like post-fulfillment inhibition,
demonstrating the persistence of accessibility may distinguish a motivational account from
alternative accounts. Accessibility from motivational sources is characterized by a relatively
slow decay whereas traditional accessibility theories would suggest a rather rapid decay over
relatively slow periods of time (Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi 1985; Srull and Wyer 1979). In
addition, techniques designed to discern motivational from nonmotivational effects have even
suggested that motivational effects are likely to increase in strength over time (Bargh et al. 2001;
Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008). In line with this, we can expect that an activated
intention ought to maintain or strengthen its activation when the time interval between the
intention question and the subsequent choices increases, maintaining or escalating the effects of
intention questions on brand choices.
 This maintenance or escalation in altered brand choices is suggested to only occur for the
first brand choice. The subsequent decrease in the choice for the most preferred brand on a
second brand choice occasion, when an intention question was answered first, is not suggested to
persist when the time lag between both choice moments is extended. The active inhibition of the
intention-related brand after intention completion would only be functional when it is likely to
interfere with the next intention in line. When no related intention is subsequently activated, the
concepts related to the previously activated intention are unlikely to interfere (Förster, Liberman,
and Higgins 2005). Therefore, the inhibition of these concepts is unlikely to be persistent.
Consequently, extending the time lag between the initial and subsequent brand choice is likely to
negate the decreased choice for the most preferred brand at the second choice instance.
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 5.1 Participants and Design
 Two hundred and thirty-eight participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight
conditions in a 2 (type of question: intention vs. attitude) ´ 2 (initial time delay: no delay vs.
delay) ´ 2 (subsequent time delay: no delay vs. delay) between-subjects design. As prior research
directed at identifying a motivational effect incorporated time delays ranging from five (Bargh et
al. 2001; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008; Sela and Shiv 2009) to eight minutes
(Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008), we used a 10-min time delay to identify whether the
question-behavior effect can be ascribed to a motivational source.
 5.2 Procedure
 The procedure paralleled that used in study 2. At the beginning of the experiment,
participants read that the research was being conducted in collaboration with a national market
research organization for confectionery products. The organization reportedly was interested in
estimating the market potential of new brands of candy bars. As indicated in table 4, participants
first reviewed the ratings of five brands of unknown candy bars on four attributes. Participants
then rank ordered the brands according to their preferences. Next, they responded to a category-
level intention question in the intention condition or an attitude question in the control condition.
In the condition without an initial delay, the first choice decision followed immediately after the
type of question manipulation. In the initial time delay condition, a 10-min filler task was
inserted between the question and initial choice decision. In the filler task, participants judged
abstract shapes, numbers, colors, and jingles on their attractiveness and similarity. The choice
decision presented to the participants informed them that the market research organization would
distribute samples of candy bars to participants; they then viewed all the brand names on the
computer monitor and revealed their choice by clicking on the preferred brand name. Next to this
initial choice decision, participants were asked to make an additional choice decision, preceded
by a 10-min filler task in the condition with a time delay between both choice decisions. As in
study 2, participants were told they had to make a second choice decision because certain
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participants could be lucky to receive two candy bars. All participants made a second choice
decision by clicking on one of the five presented brand names.
 Table 4. Overview of the Procedure Used in Study 3
Type of QuestionCondition Attribute
information
Preference
Ranking Attitude
Question
Intention
Question
Time
Delay
Choice Time
Delay
Choice
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
3 ? ? ? ? ? ?
4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
5 ? ? ? ? ? ?
6 ? ? ? ? ? ?
7 ? ? ? ? ?
8 ? ? ? ? ?
 5.3 Results and Discussion
 Initial Brand Choice. Table 5 presents the choice share of the five brands in each condition at
the first choice instance.
 Table5. Overview of Initial Brand Choices by Condition in Study 3
Type of
question
Initial
Time Lag
N Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5
Attitude Low 61 65.6% 18.0% 11.5% 3.3% 1.6%
Intention Low 62 79.0% 19.4% 1.6% 0% 0%
Attitude High 60 41.7% 41.7% 11.7% 3.3% 1.7%
Intention High 55 85.5% 12.7% 0% 1.8% 0%
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 In line with our expectations, and as shown in figure 2, a logistic regression analysis
estimating the choice for the most preferred brand at the initial choice moment revealed a
significant interaction effect between type of question (intention vs. attitude question) and time
lag (absent or present) between the question and the first choice (Wald ?² = 5.275, p = .022).
Specifically, the most preferred choice option was chosen more often in the intention question
condition (82.1 %) than in the attitude question condition (53.7 %) (?² (238) = 21.817, p < .001).
In the attitude question condition, the most preferred brand was chosen less often in case a time
lag between the attitude question and the initial brand choice was present (41.7 %) versus absent
(65.6 %) (?² (121) = 6.954, p = .007). In contrast, in the intention question condition, the most
preferred brand was chosen more often in case there was a time lag between the intention
question and the initial brand choice (85.5 %) compared to when the initial brand choice
immediately followed the intention question (79.0 %). This difference was not significant (?²
(117) = .816, p = .255), though.
 Figure 2. Effect of Time Delay and Type of Question on Initial Choice of the Most Preferred
 Brand
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 Subsequent Brand Choice. Table 6 presents the choice share of the five brands in each
condition at the second choice instance. Moreover, as shown in figure 3, a logistic regression
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estimating  the choice for the most preferred brand (conditional upon the choice for this brand at
the first choice instance) at the second choice instance also revealed a significant interaction
between type of question (intention versus attitude) and time lag (present versus absent) (Wald ?²
= 4.514, p = .034). Specifically, in the absence of a time lag between the two choice instances,
respondents who chose their most preferred brand at the first choice instance were significantly
less likely to reselect this brand at the second choice instance if they previously answered an
intention question (11.1 %) as compared to an attitude question (45.2 %) (?² (76) = 11.350, p =
.001). If there was a time lag between both choice instances, no difference in the choice
likelihood of the most preferred brand was observed between the intention question condition
and the attitude question condition (29.4 % vs. 35.3 %; ?² = .326, p = .368). In other words, a
decrease in the choice share of the most preferred brand in the intention question condition is
only observed when there is no time delay between the two choice moments.
 Table 6. Overview of Subsequent Brand Choices by Condition in Study 3
Type of
question
Subsequent
Time Lag
N Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5
Attitude Low 61 44.3% 39.3% 13.1% 1.6% 1.6%
Intention Low 62 27.4% 59.7% 11.3% 0% 1.6%
Attitude High 60 48.3% 26.7% 18.3% 5.0% 1.7%
Intention High 55 27.3% 56.4% 10.9% 3.6% 1.8%
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Figure 3. Effect of Time Delay and Type of Question on the Subsequent Choice of the Most
Preferred Brand Conditional on its Initial Choice
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 The results of study 3 provide further support for the notion that merely responding to an
intention question may activate this intention, which instigates behavior aligned with this
motivational state. Consistent with a motivational account, we find a persistent occurrence of the
question behavior effect as the time interval between the intention question and the brand choice
increases. Also consistent with the proposed motivational account is the reversal in the choice
pattern at the second choice instance, at least when the second choice task immediately follows
the first one. As the time interval between the two choice tasks increases, the choice share of the
most preferred brand returns to a level comparable to that of the control condition.
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
 6.1 Summary of Findings
 This article investigates why measuring intentions has such a profound influence on
subsequent behavior. The results of three studies confirm that when a consumer responds to an
intention question, an intention becomes activated and cognitive processes initiate to ensure the
intended action gets executed. Study 1 confirms that when a consumer responds to an intention
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question, cognitive processes initiate. It establishes that a brand related to a particular intention
remains in a heightened state of activation until the choice is made. Thereafter, a reverse pattern
emerges, and brands related to a completed intention experience inhibition. Furthermore, brands
that are most competing with the completion of an intention get inhibited until the intention
completion takes place. Study 1 also demonstrates directly that changes in brand activation drive
the question-behavior effect. As such, this study provides initial evidence that the fundamental
principles of a motivational perspective on answering intention questions applies to the question-
behavior effect.
 Study 2 provides further evidence for a motivational account of the question-behavior effect
by showing how the effect develops in a sequential choice setting. Unlike predictions based on
existing theoretical accounts such as attitude accessibility, response fluency and cognitive
dissonance, predictions derived from a motivational perspective (i.e., a pre-choice accessibility
advantage and a post-choice accessibility deficit of the most preferred brand) suggest that the
question behavior effect may extend beyond immediate choices. Specifically, a motivational
account suggests a dynamic pattern of brand accessibilities regarding the most preferred brand
and predicts a continuation of this dynamic pattern in consumers’ choices. The results of study 2
demonstrate that increased activation of intention-related brands prior to behavioral enactment
and their inhibition after behavioral enactment translates into consumers? choice decisions.
Specifically, we find a unique choice pattern of an initial increase and subsequent decrease in the
choice of the most preferred brand when brand choices follow an intention question.
 Study 3 lends further support to a motivational account of the question-behavior effect by
demonstrating a larger effect when a time lag is introduced between the intention question and
the initial brand choice behavior. This is in line with the predicted motivational account, because
persistence is an interesting property of the changes in the relative activation of concepts in
memory. In contrast with traditional accessibility theories, which argue that the accessibility of
cognitions declines with the passage of time (Higgins 1996), the accessibility of intention-related
concepts depends on their intentional status (uncompleted vs. completed), rather than time
elapsed. In contrast with information unrelated to an intention, intention-related information
likely remains active up until the enactment of the intention. Increased accessibility thus persists
as long as the intention is active (Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 2005). This prediction differs
from the type of accessibility acquired through semantic priming, which produces decay over
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relatively short periods of time (Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi 1985; Srull and Wyer 1979).
Moreover, combining the current findings with semantic priming concepts creates some
interesting research opportunities. When a primed concept becomes the object of an intention,
behavioral consequences of priming may last longer. If a brand gets primed prior to responses to
an intention question, and this brand successfully becomes the object of a purchase intention, it
may lead to altered purchase behavior, even weeks after the priming.
 Overall, the reported studies indicate that responding to an intention question activates an
intention. In all three studies the intention question is hypothetical as it asks respondents to report
what their behavior would be assuming that the candy bars are available to them. Yet, we find
that responding to hypothetical intention questions has comparable effects than responding to
real intention questions. This might suggest that consumers merely discard the hypotheticality of
the intention questions. This proposition is in line with prior research findings on the effects of
hypothetical questions which already showed that responding to purely hypothetical questions
has a substantial biasing effect on consumers’ behavior (Fitzsimons & Shiv, 2001).
 The finding that competing choice options are inhibited after responding to an intention
question also may transfer to brand choices. That is, responding to an intention question inhibits
well-preferred, distracting brands, so if a most preferred option is out-of-stock, consumers may
choose a less preferred brand if they have previously answered an intention question, due to the
inhibition of their well-preferred, distracting brands. Therefore, it may be important for
manufacturers to ensure well-preferred brands appear on the retail floor to override this
inhibition. Additional studies should investigate the consequences of the specific accessibility
pattern associated with motivational behavior for consumers’ purchase behavior.
 6.2 Limitations and Directions for Further Research
 Although this research sheds new light on the operation of the question-behavior effect, these
results cannot account for behavioral changes induced by satisfaction measures. Considerable
research demonstrates the behavioral effects of satisfaction measures (Borle et al. 2007;
Dholakia and Morwitz 2002); for example, Dholakia and Morwitz (2002) find that measuring
satisfaction in a financial services setting influences not only single purchases but also
customers’ relational behaviors over an extended period of time. The proposed motivational
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perspective relates specifically to the consequences of answering intention questions and thus
cannot provide insight into these findings. However, perhaps satisfaction measures serve “as the
basis for attitude formation, which then serves as the most salient basis for the development of an
intention” (Feldman and Lynch 1988, 423). If responding to a satisfaction measure instigates
spontaneous intention formation, the properties of motivational states may play a role in the
question-behavior effect caused by a satisfaction measure. Further research should investigate
the mechanisms that drive the behavioral effects of reporting satisfaction.
 Furthermore, we expect the motivational account to contribute to a wide array of question-
behavior effects. While several explanations have already been proposed to account for the
question-behavior effect, they can all only account for a part of the reported question-behavior
manifestations. For instance, attitude accessibility does not predict a behavior change when
brand attitudes are equally accessible at the time of responding to an intention question (Morwitz
and Fitzsimons 2004). Response fluency is most likely to have an influence when people fail to
consider attribute information, but not when consumers know a considerable amount about the
product (Janiszewski and Chandon 2007), and the cognitive dissonance account is limited to
explaining changes in socially desirable behaviors.
 While a motivational account is likely to play a role in a vast array of question-behavior
effects, a motivational mechanism is less likely to be operating in certain instances compared to
other explanations. For instance, the proposed motivational perspective requires the formation of
an intention toward a specific target for the alteration of brand choices to occur. If consumers
merely respond to a category-level intention without tying a specific brand to it, no motivation-
driven changes in brand choices should emerge. Therefore, additional research should examine
which factors determine the formation of a brand-level intention in response to a category-level
intention question.
 In addition, the activation of a certain goal may evoke associated behaviors, previously used
to achieve the goal. Planning how to achieve a goal has been shown to reduce the likelihood to
apply out-of-plan behaviors to reach the goal (Bayuk, Janiszewski, and LeBoeuf 2010). As such,
the activation of a goal may prevent the activation of an intention by responding to an intention
question when the questioned behavior is not in line with the activated goal.
 Finally, further research should examine the moderating factors that may diminish the effects
of responding to intention questions, in line with a motivational rationale. For example, power
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affects basic cognitive processes (Guinote 2007), such that powerful persons have greater access
to task-relevant constructs prior to task performance, whereas after this performance, the
accessibility of these constructs declines (Slabu and Guinote 2010). The cognitive processes of
activation and inhibition thus appear more influential for powerful compared with powerless
persons. Given more distinct changes in the cognitive set-up follow the activation of a
motivation for powerful people, powerful people likely exhibit a stronger question-behavior
effect than do powerless ones. Specifically, powerful people more readily set goals. They need
less time to decide on a desired course of action (Guinote, 2007). Based on this we suggest that
powerful individuals may be more likely to set an intention after responding to an intention
question. In general, to strengthen the claim that responding to an intention question sets a
motivational mechanism into motion further research should demonstrate that factors that have
an influence on goal pursuit and intention completion affect the magnitude of the question-
behavior effect.
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CHAPTER III: THE COMBINED INFLUENCE OF SELECTIVE FOCUS AND
DECISION INVOLVEMENT ON MEMORY-BASED DECISION MAKING6
 Marketers often use salient stimuli to draw consumers’ attention to a specific brand in the
hope that a selective focus on the own brand increases the sales of this brand. However, previous
studies are inconsistent concerning the impact that selectively focusing on a specific brand has
on final brand choice. To offer an explanation for these inconsistent results, this paper introduces
decision involvement as a moderator of the relation between selective focus and attitude-decision
consistency. Two studies indicate that selectively focusing on a not most preferred alternative
indeed alters choice decisions, but only when decision involvement is low. Study 1 further shows
that this interaction effect between selective focus and involvement takes place in the selection
rather than the brand consideration stage. By introducing level of processing next to decision
involvement, Study 2 shows that the interaction effect emerges even in limited processing
conditions. The study also reconciles different explanations for the negative effect of selective
focus on attitude-behavior consistency. Selectively focusing on a not preferred choice option
when consumer are low involved and use limited processing seems to lead to inconsistent
choices because of an increased accessibility of the focal option, whereas selective focus on a not
preferred option when consumers are low involved and use deep processing lead to inconsistent
choices because of attitude polarization.
6 Chapter III is published as “Van Kerckhove, A., Vermeir, I. and Geuens, M. (2011). Combined Influence of
Selective Focus and Decision Involvement on Attitude-Behavior Consistency in a Context of Memory-Based
Decision Making. Psychology & Marketing, 28 (6), 539-560.”
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 The objective of many marketing actions is to change people’s attitudes towards certain
brands, products or behaviors. Marketers do this in the assumption that inducing a positive
attitude towards a brand will turn out in attitude-consistent buying behavior and increased sales
(Chattopadhyay & Nedungadi, 1990; Brown & Stayman, 1992). However, a multitude of studies
have already shown that behavior is often not in line with the reported attitudes (e.g., De
Cannière, De Pelsmacker, & Geuens, 2009; Fazio et al. 1982; Sivacek & Crano, 1982; Smith &
Swinyard, 1983; Kraus, 1995; Glasman & Albarracin, 2006). For instance, a consumer with
positive attitudes towards sustainable products may not buy them because of the low perceived
availability of these products, whereas consumers with negative attitudes may buy them because
of social pressure (Vermeir & Verbeke, 2006).
 Although changing consumers’ choice decisions by changing their brand attitudes can be a
fruitful approach, there is also evidence that brand choices can be significantly altered simply by
making a brand more salient than its competitors in the decision context (Nedungadi, 1990).
Previous research shows that enhancing a brand’s salience increases the consideration of this
brand (Alba & Chattopadhyay, 1986; Nedungadi, 1990), as well as the choice for this focal brand
(Nedungadi, 1990; Posavac, Sanbonmatsu, & Ho, 2002). For example, Posavac, Sanbonmatsu,
and Ho (2002) show that selectively focusing on the second most preferred choice option sways
choice in favor of that option and away from the option that was initially most preferred. Hence,
attitude-decision consistency decreases when the selective focus is on a not most preferred
choice alternative.
 In contrast to the foregoing, Coates, Butler, and Berry (2004) found that selective focus had
an influence on brand consideration, but in none of their three studies did this effect extend to
choice itself. Given these inconsistent results, a first objective of the current research is to extend
prior knowledge on the conditions under which the effect of selective focus on choice behavior
can be expected by introducing decision involvement as a moderator. In view of the pervasive
influence of choice involvement on consumers’ information processing and decision making
(cfr., ELM, HSM), it is indeed conceivable that the impact of selectively focusing on a certain
product alternative will be different in a low versus high involvement decision situation.
 In addition, the current research also addresses at which stage in the decision process this
moderation takes place. Because selective focus and decision involvement may exert their
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influence in the brand consideration and/or brand selection stage, investigating the level at which
these factors moderate the attitude-behavior relation is a second objective of this study.
 Finally, this research also investigates the level of processing of the focal brand that is
necessary for the selective focus effect to emerge. Consumers can attend to the focal brand in a
shallow or deep way. Previous studies on the role of selective focus did not acknowledge
differences in processing styles and most often they used conditions of forced, focused attention
and elaborate processing of the focal brand (Nedungadi, 1990; Posavac et al., 2002; Del Missier,
Ferrante, & Constantini, 2007). Given the expectation that selective attention is more effective to
alter the choice decisions of low involved consumers, it is necessary to investigate whether this
effect also occurs when the focal brand is processed superficially. Thus, this research attempts to
address three key questions:
 (1) Does decision involvement moderate the influence of selective focus on choice decisions?
 (2) At what stage in the decision process does this interaction take place? In other words,
how is the process of decision making affected by selective focus and decision involvement?
 (3) Is a shallow, superficial level of processing of the focal brand sufficient in order to attain
an effect of selective focus on decision making?
 By investigating these questions, the current research makes the following contributions:
First, investigating the effect of paying attention to marketing stimuli, presented in the decision
context, on decision making helps managers in their development of effective communication
strategies. By identifying a boundary condition for the effect, communication managers can more
effectively decide whether generating a most liked or generating a most prominent brand is more
essential. Second, this research adds to the knowledge on selective focus and decision making,
on the one hand by identifying involvement as a moderator and investigating at what stage in the
decision making process the interaction effect emerges and, on the other hand, by investigating
the necessary level of cognitive processing of the focal brand. The latter is especially important
because selective focus is most likely to affect choices of low involved consumers. These
consumers are not motivated to carefully process decision-relevant marketing stimuli. This
contrasts sharply with the induced elaborate processing in previous studies on selective focus.
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 Combined Influence of Selective Focus and Decision Involvement on Attitude-Behavior
Consistency
 Consumers are, literally, surrounded by numerous marketing stimuli, such as advertisements,
commercials, direct mails, and point-of-purchase materials, all competing for the consumers’
attention (Lee & Lee, 2007). To help manage this volume of information, consumers control
their own information processing and engage in selective attention, which leads to processing
only a limited number of communication stimuli and ignoring many others (Posavac et al., 2002;
Taylor, Franke, & Bang, 2006). How this selective attention for contextual marketing stimuli has
an effect on consumers’ behavior is critical knowledge for marketers in order to design effective
marketing communications (Holden & Vanhuele, 1999).
 Posavac et al. (2002) showed that selectively focusing on certain alternatives may indeed
have an influence on choice and thereby also on attitude-behavior consistency. Selectively
focusing on a brand prior to choice may result in a different decision. Consequently, attitude-
decision consistency may increase or decrease, depending on the initial position in the preference
ranking of the focal brand. If consumers attend to their most preferred choice option, attitude-
decision consistency may increase because the highlighted option may be particularly likely to
be chosen. However, if consumers attend to a not most preferred choice option, attitude-decision
consistency may decrease because the likelihood that the focal option is chosen increases, which
decreases the likelihood that the most preferred option is chosen (Posavac et al., 2002). However,
selectively focusing on a specific choice alternative does not always have the previously
described effect. Coates, Butler, and Berry (2004) indicate that selectively attending to a certain
brand may affect brand consideration, but not brand choice. Their work suggests that simply
focusing on a not most preferred alternative prior to choice may only in some instances be
sufficient to alter brand choice. Therefore, the current paper introduces the level of involvement
with the choice decision as a potential moderator of the influence of selective focus on attitude-
decision consistency.
 Zaichkowsky (1985, p. 342) defined involvement as ‘a person’s perceived relevance of the
object based on inherent needs, values, and interests’. This concept of involvement, applied to
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decision research, pertains to ‘the perceived relevance or importance of the decision to an
individual’. Generally, the level of involvement with purchase decisions is associated with
systematic variations in the extensiveness of information search and information processing. The
more involved individuals are, the more cognitive effort and time they will allocate to decision
making in order to arrive at a valid decision (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Krosnick,
1988). Hence, the more involved individuals are with a decision, the more systematic they will
be in their decision making, and the less susceptible they will be to peripheral cues. Several
studies already indicated, in line with the assumptions of the Elaboration Likelihood Model
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980), that high
involved individuals’ behavior is more attitude-consistent than the behavior of their low involved
counterparts (Kokkinaki & Lunt, 1997). Building on the foregoing, an interaction effect between
selective focus and decision involvement seems likely (see Table 1).
Table 1. Hypothesized Attitude-Decision Consistency as a Function of Decision Involvement
and Selective Focus
Selective Focus
Decision Involvement Most Preferred Alternative Not Most Preferred
Alternative
Low
High
High
High
Low
High
 Selectively focusing on a certain alternative prior to decision making, will only influence
brand choice when subjects are uninvolved with the decision. More specifically, selectively
focusing on a not most preferred choice alternative will only reduce the degree of attitude-
behavior consistency when involvement is low. When individuals are highly involved and fully
evaluate each alternative, they will end up choosing the alternative to which they hold the most
positive attitude. Thus,
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 H1. Decision involvement moderates the effect of selective focus on the attitude-decision
 relationship. When involvement is low and selective focus is on a not most preferred attitude-
 decision consistency will be lower than when involvement is high and/or selective focus is on
 the most preferred alternative.
1.2 A Two-Stage Decision Process
 This article focuses on memory-based choice situations, which means that the choice options
are not displayed in the decision context (Lynch & Srull, 1982; Posavac, Herzenstein, &
Sanbonmatsu, 2003). For example, when thinking of a nice restaurant to make reservations for
the evening dinner, it is not plausible you have a list of all possible restaurants at your disposal.
Instead, it is much more likely that you have to recall the restaurants you know and then you can
select one to visit this evening. When choice is memory-based, it is clear that consumers have to
do more than simply assess the different choice alternatives or behavioral options and pick the
one they prefer the most. Possible choice options first have to be constructed or retrieved from
memory (Posavac et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important to take possible consideration set
effects on brand choice probabilities into account. From this point of view, it is advisable to
divide the choice model in two stages: a brand consideration stage and a brand selection stage
(e.g., Bronnenberg & Vanhonacker, 1996; Nedungadi, 1990; Urban, Hulland, & Weinberg,
1993). Figure 1 depicts the hypothesized influences of selective focus and decision involvement
on brand consideration and brand selection.
 Figure 1. Overview of the Conceptual Background and Hypotheses (Study 1)
Selective focus Consideration set
composition
Brand selection
H2
H3RQ1
Decision
involvement
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1.2.1 Influence of Selective Focus and Decision Involvement on Brand Consideration
 In the brand consideration stage consumers put their consideration set together.
‘Consideration set’ as used here, refers to ‘the set of brands brought to mind on a particular
choice occasion’7 (Nedungadi, 1990). The composition of the consideration set depends on the
memorability of the choice options. In order to consider an alternative, it is a precondition that
this alternative is accessible from memory (Nedungadi, 1990).
 Usually, the strength and favorability of an attitude towards a brand correlates positively with
its accessibility. Therefore, more liked alternatives generally have a greater chance of
consideration than disliked alternatives (Posavac, Sanbonmatsu, & Fazio, 1997). In addition,
strongly liked brands have a greater chance of consideration than weakly liked (or disliked)
brands (Priester et al., 2004). It is, however, not guaranteed that all consumers retrieve their most
preferred brands from memory, because it is not always the case that the most preferred options
are the most accessible ones (Posavac et al., 1997). Recent exposure to a particular brand
increases its ‘salience’ (defined as ‘the prominence or level of activation of a brand in memory’)
and thereby increases a consumer’s ability to recall this brand (Alba & Chattopadhyay, 1986).
For instance, social or marketing interventions in the context of the decision making process may
increase the salience of a not most preferred brand and may make this brand more accessible,
relative to other, more preferred, choice options. Therefore, selectively focusing on a particular
brand can alter the composition of the consideration set. Inducing a consumer to selectively
focus on a brand prior to decision making may increase the chance on retrieval of this brand
regardless of the fact that the focal brand is the most preferred or a not most preferred one.
 H2: Selectively focusing on a brand positively influences the presence of this brand in the
 consideration set
7 This conceptualization of a consideration set may not be the most conventional one. In recognizing that consumers
may use more than two stages to simplify decision making, certain prior studies have made a distinction between the
retrieval set (i.e., a subset of all brands a consumer is aware of that one can access from memory) and the
consideration set (i.e., a subset of brands in the retrieval set that are scrutinized carefully on a particular choice
occasion) (Shocker et al., 1991). In this respect, our conceptualization of a consideration set might be seen as more
closely related to that of a retrieval set.
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 Given the overall expectation of an interaction effect between selective focus and decision
involvement on attitude-decision consistency, it is possible that this interaction already originates
at the brand consideration level. Support for this proposition can be found in the fact that high
involved consumers’ latitudes of acceptance for alternative brands are generally rather narrow
(Rothchild & Houston, 1977). Their willingness to consider less preferred alternatives is smaller.
Selectively focusing on a not most preferred brand may consequently be less effective in terms
of brand consideration when involvement is high versus low. In contrast, involvement motivates
consumers to consider and process more brands for final choice in order to diminish the
perceived risk of excluding an optimal choice from the consideration set (Gronhaug, 1973;
Chakravarti & Janiszewski, 2003; Konstandoulaki & Kokkinaki, 2009). Therefore, selectively
focusing on a not most preferred brand may increase the admittance of the focal brand in the
consideration set when involvement is high versus low. Given these two opposite lines of
reasoning, selectively focusing on a not most preferred brand may turn out to be more, less or
equally effective in altering the composition of the consideration set of both low and high
involved consumers.
 RQ1: What is the impact of selectively focusing on a not most preferred brand on
 consideration of this focal brand for low and high involved consumers?
1.2.2 Influence of Selective Focus and Decision Involvement on Brand Selection
 Furthermore, accounting for the expected interaction effect of selective focus and decision
involvement on attitude-decision consistency, this interaction may not only be produced at the
brand consideration level (RQ1), but also at the brand selection level. In this second stage of the
decision process, the brand selection stage, consumers turn to assessing the brands they included
in the consideration set and one brand is selected for purchase (Nedungadi, 1990). To arrive at a
final choice, consumers can use a variety of decision rules. A general assumption is that,
irrespective of the precise choice process, consumers will select the most positively evaluated
brand included in the consideration set. Attitude-consistent choice then requires accessing the
attitudes towards the considered alternatives, and choosing the most favored option.
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 Thus, an increased chance of retrieving a choice option does not automatically transfer into
an increased choice of this brand. The current research proposes that decision involvement may
affect this transfer of brand consideration to brand selection, by exerting an influence on the
extensiveness of brand evaluations. Respondents may devote more effort on the evaluation of
different choice alternatives when decisions are perceived as highly consequential. And, to the
extent that consumers devote effort to the assessment of alternatives, the attitudes towards the
alternatives are more likely to determine the choice decision (Posavac et al., 2003). In contrast,
when decision involvement is low, consumers may not want to allocate much time and effort to
decision making and consequently they may choose the option that came to mind first or they
may misattribute the salience of the brand to brand liking (cf. mere exposure) (Zajonc, 1980). It
is in this circumstance that an increase in retrieval probability of a not most preferred choice
option, due to selective focus, may lead to brand choice.
 H3: The increased admittance of a not most preferred choice option in the consideration set
 will be more likely to result in an inconsistent choice decision when decision involvement is
 low (versus high)
 Taken together, distinguishing between a brand consideration and a brand selection stage
enables an investigation of the processes that underlie brand consideration and brand selection.
Brand choice influencing factors can have a different level of importance in these two stages in
the choice process (Nedungadi, 1990). According to the predictions in this research, selective
focus and decision involvement can both alter the composition of the consideration set.
However, it is unclear whether selective focus is equally likely to alter the composition of the
consideration set for both low and high involved individuals. Further, this research predicts the
level of involvement to moderate the influence of selective focus in the brand selection stage.
When consumers are highly involved, consumers may spend more time and effort on decision
making. And thus, admittance of a not most preferred brand in the consideration set does not
cause a decrease in attitude-decision consistency. Inclusion in the consideration set is not a
sufficient condition for brand choice. An increase in the retrieval probability of a not most
preferred choice option may only transfer to brand choice under low involvement conditions.
Hence, besides investigating the combined influence of involvement and selective focus on
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attitude-decision consistency, the objective of Study 1 is also to address at which stage in the
decision process these factors moderate the attitude-behavior relation.
2. STUDY 1
2.1 Method
 The first study consists of two moments of data collection, separated from each other by one
week. In the first phase, the respondents reported their attitudes towards 14 different charities,
i.e., the focal object of this research. The second phase began with the selective focus
manipulation. Subsequently, the participants were induced to choose one charity to receive a
donation, after which the level of involvement with the choice decision was measured. The
experiment was a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with a manipulation of selective focus at two
levels (focus on the most preferred brand vs. focus on the fourth most preferred brand), and a
distinction between two levels of involvement (low involvement vs. high involvement).
2.1.1 Participants
 A sample of 846 students received an e-mail with an invitation to participate in the
experiment in exchange for a movie ticket. In the first phase 346 respondents voluntarily filled in
the questionnaire. In total 254 (113 men and 141 women) of these participants (73.4%) also
completed the second questionnaire.
2.1.2 Procedure and Manipulations
Pretest. A pretest was run to get an overview of the charities people are aware of. More
specifically, the goal of this pretest was to identify those charitable organizations that people are
most likely to retrieve from memory spontaneously. Given that this study wants to determine
whether participants make memory-based choices that are consistent with their attitudes, it was
necessary to define a set of charities that is 1) limited enough to make a concise questionnaire,
but 2) at the same time extensive enough to capture the majority of the charitable organizations
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that participants will mention in the memory-based choice decision task. In this pretest, about 40
students listed all the charities they knew. Only nationally operating charities that were
mentioned by at least five students were retained. This resulted in a list of 14 well-known
charities.
First Experimental Phase. In the first data collection phase respondents filled in a web-based
questionnaire that contained basic demographic questions, questions with respect to their buying
behavior in general and the degree to which they were familiar with buying products in four
different categories. Subsequently, respondents received lists of brands/organizations, which
reside within these four categories, with the task of rank ordering these brands/organizations
according to their preferences, starting with their most preferred brand/organization. By means of
this rank ordering task, an indication of the relative favorableness of participants’ attitudes was
obtained, with lower values indicating greater favorableness (Posavac et al., 2003). This
indication of the relative preference of each participant for the 14 charitable organizations was
then used to determine the most and fourth most preferred charity (i.e., the focal charities) for
each individual. Besides charitable organizations, participants also had to rank order different
brands of soft drinks, mobile phones, and newspapers. These distracter categories were included
in the questionnaire to obscure the fact that charitable organizations were the focus of this
research. Further, attitudes towards each object were not only measured in a relative, but also in
an absolute sense, by a 1-item 7-point Likert scale (e.g., How would you describe your attitude
towards the [charity]? with -3 = very negative and +3 = very positive).
Second Experimental Phase. The participants received a second questionnaire one week after
they completed the first one. In this questionnaire the researchers informed the participants they
needed more data on each brand in all four categories, but that each respondent only had to
answer more detailed questions on one brand. This was done to make the participants less
suspicious of the research goal, but in reality this was the selective focus manipulation.
Following Posavac et al. (2002), the manipulation consisted of six attitudinal questions, either on
their most preferred charitable organization or on their fourth most preferred charitable
organization (e.g., How much do you know about the [focal charity]? How important do you
consider the functions served by the [focal charity]?). Posavac et al. (2002) have illustrated the
adequacy of asking multiple attitudinal questions as a manipulation of selective focus. Following
the selective focus manipulation, participants decided on a charitable organization to receive a
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
- 96 -
donation of 250 euro. Subsequently, the level of involvement with the choice decision
participants had to make was measured. Participants indicated the perceived importance of the
decision on a 1-item 7-point scale (How important was the selection of the charity to you? with -
3 = very unimportant and +3 = very important). Participants were then split in two groups, based
on the median of the perceived importance of the decision (Mlow = -1.11, Mhigh = 1.64, t(252)= -
20.39, p < .001). Next, the participants listed the other charities they could retrieve in a
descending order (from more to less preferred). Afterwards, they reported again their (absolute)
attitudes towards each charity on the same 1-item 7-point Likert scale as in the first phase.
Besides this, the participants also indicated how much attention they had paid to each charity on
a 1-item 7-point Likert scale (How much attention did you pay to [focal charity] while filling in
the questionnaire? with -3 = very little and +3 = very much). Participants that selectively focused
on their most preferred choice option reported to have paid more attention to this focal option
compared to participants that selectively focused on their fourth most preferred choice option
(Mfocus_option_1 = 1.93, Mfocus_option_4 = 1.53, t(255)= 2.55, p = .011). Participants that selectively
focused on their fourth most preferred choice option reported to have given more attention to this
focal option compared to participants that selectively focused on their most preferred choice
option (Mfocus_option_1 = .72, Mfocus_option_4 = 1.17, t(255)= -2.77, p = .006). This finding indicates
that the selective focus manipulation was successful. At the end of the questionnaire, respondents
were probed for suspicion. None of the respondents realized what the real goal of the study was.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Attitude–Decision Consistency
 Attitude-decision consistency was defined here as a binary variable that indicates whether the
option that was most preferred in the first phase was also selected in the second phase. First, it
appears that overall the low involved participants make significantly more inconsistent choices
compared to the high involved participants (62.9% vs. 42.3%, ?²(1, N = 252) = 9.76, p = .002). In
addition, those who focused on the most preferred choice option make significantly less
inconsistent choices compared to those who focused on the fourth most preferred brand (42.5%
vs. 56.8%, ?²(1, N = 252) = 5.14, p = .023). More importantly, a ?²-test investigated the
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hypothesis regarding the moderating impact of involvement on the effect of selective focus on
attitude-behavior consistency under the condition that decision involvement is low (H1). Results
show that significantly more attitude-inconsistent choices were made when low involved
participants focused on a not most preferred choice option (74.5%) compared to high involved
participants (46.2%) (?²(1, N = 125) = 9.58, p = .002). When the focus was on the most preferred
choice option, low and high involved participants were equally likely to make an attitude-
inconsistent choice (50.0% vs. 38.8%, ?²(1, N = 127) = 1.44, p = .231). These results lend
support to H1. The following analyses can now verify at what stage in the decision process these
two choice influencing factors (selective focus & involvement) exert an influence and cause this
interaction effect.
 2.2.2 Brand Consideration Stage
 In order to perform the appropriate analyses regarding the effect of selective focus on brand
consideration, five dependent variables were constructed. These five dichotomous variables
indicate whether a charity, that made it to the top five in the first phase, was retrieved from
memory in the second phase. The first variable gives an indication of whether or not the charity,
that was most preferred in the first phase, was retrieved from memory in the second phase. The
second, third, fourth and fifth variable indicate the same, but then for the rest of the charities that
constituted the top five in the first phase.
 First, ?²-tests examined whether selectively focusing on a brand led to a higher chance of
brand retrieval (H2). The  tests reveal significant differences between the two selective focus
conditions in the number of respondents that took the most preferred option into consideration
??²(1, N = 253) = 33.32, p < .001) and in the number of respondents that took the fourth most
preferred option into consideration (?²(1, N = 252) = 46.18, p < .001). As many as 97.6% of the
participants in the condition with the selective focus on the most preferred option took this most
preferred choice option into consideration, versus only 71.4% of the participants in the condition
with the selective focus on the fourth most preferred choice option. On the other hand, the
proportion of participants that considered the fourth most preferred choice option was much
higher in the condition that selectively focused on this option (86.5%), compared to the condition
that selectively focused on the most preferred choice option (46.0%). In line with expectations,
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no significant differences between the two selective focus conditions in the consideration of the
second (?²(1, N = 252) = 0.38, p = .611), third (?²(1, N = 251) = .00, p = 1.000), and fifth (?²(1, N
= 250) = 1.03, p = .375) most preferred choice option were perceived. In line with H2, retrieval
of the most preferred choice option (the fourth most preferred choice option) was significantly
higher when participants had selectively focused upon this most preferred choice option (fourth
most preferred choice option) (see Figure 2).
 Figure 2. Percentage of Respondents that considers their Five Most Preferred
 Choice Options According to the Selective Focus Condition
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 Another ?²-test examined whether selectively focusing on a not most preferred brand led to a
higher, lower or equal chance of brand consideration for high versus low involved individuals
(RQ1). The test reveals that both high and low involved participants were equally likely to
consider the fourth most preferred choice option after they were induced to selectively focus on
this option ( 83.3% vs. 91.7%, ?²(1, N = 126) = 1.77, p = .184). This finding indicates that
selectively focusing on a not most preferred choice option affects brand consideration set
composition, irrespective of the level of involvement.
 In summary, selective focus significantly influences brand consideration. Selectively
focusing upon a certain brand increases the chance that this brand will be retrieved from memory
prior to choice. Furthermore, the increased admittance of a not most preferred, focal brand in the
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consideration set is equally likely for both low and high involved participants. The interaction
between involvement and selective focus, confirmed in H1, does not take place in the
consideration stage.
 2.2.3 Brand Selection Stage
 So far, the data indicate that selectively focusing on a not most preferred brand influences
brand retrieval probabilities, irrespective of the level of decision involvement. But, to reduce
attitude-decision consistency, participants not only have to consider a not most preferred choice
option, they should also choose this option. Decision involvement can play a significant role in
this brand selection phase, as hypothesized in H3.
 H3 assumes that the increased admittance of a not most preferred choice option in the
consideration set is more likely to transfer to brand choice when decision involvement is low
(versus high). The analysis to test this proposition included only participants that selectively
focused on their fourth most preferred choice option and also subsequently considered this
option. A ?²-test shows that the selected participants in the low involvement condition were more
likely to finally make an inconsistent choice decision (74.4%) compared to the selected
participants in the high involvement condition (44.6%). The difference between the two decision
involvement conditions is significant (?²(1, N = 108) = 9.35, p = .002). Figure 3 graphically
presents this finding that the interaction effect between selective focus and decision involvement
takes place in the brand selection stage, and not in the brand consideration stage.
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Figure 3. Percentage of Respondents that Considers the Focal Option and Makes an
Inconsistent Choice after Focusing on a Not Most Preferred Choice Option According to the
Level of Involvement
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2.3 Discussion
 The results of this experiment indicate that merely selectively focusing on a not most
preferred brand alters the consideration set composition and can also affect the subsequent
choice decision. The latter is more likely when decision involvement is low (versus high).
Hence, when involvement is low, simply increasing the accessibility of a not most favored brand
might lead to a final choice of this brand. On the other hand, irrespective of brand focus, when
decision involvement is high, consumers are very likely to retrieve their most preferred brand
and to rely on their previously formed attitudes to select the brand they really like the most.
 Given this finding that selective focus has an effect on choice for low-involved consumers, it
would be a non sequitur to assume profound processing of the focal brand. Consumers may
interpret stimuli with different processing styles, depending on the level of their motivation
(Obermiller, 1985). Low-involved consumers are often not motivated to carefully process
decision relevant marketing stimuli (Coates, Butler, & Berry, 2004). Stating that merely
selectively focusing on a certain brand in the decision context can alter brand choices when
decision involvement is low is only a useful finding for marketers when this effect is also bound
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to occur when the focal brand is only superficially attended. Therefore, Study 2 addresses how
the depth of processing of the selectively presented brand affects our findings of Study 1.
3. STUDY 2
 Study 2 is designed to 1) validate the occurrence of an interaction between involvement and
selective focus, and 2) extend this finding by investigating what level of cognitive processing of
the focal brand is necessary for the effect under study to occur.
 Several psychological studies have already investigated the effect of the depth of processing
on memory and recall (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975; Challis,
Velichkovsky, & Craik, 1996). In general, the level of processing can affect (brand) retrieval, but
it especially has an influence on the duration of the effect. Although a deeper level of processing
has a more enduring effect on brand retrieval, even a lower level of processing should affect
brand memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This paper focuses especially on the influence of
selectively focusing on a brand immediately prior to decision making. Therefore, limited
processing of the focal brand may still have an effect on brand retrieval. The same saliency and
processing biases arguments that were used to develop the hypotheses for Study 1, lead to the
expectation that limited processing of the focal brand will not only have an effect on brand
retrieval but that this effect will also transfer through to brand choice under conditions of low
involvement. Thus,
 H4: Limited processing of a not most preferred, focal brand decreases attitude-decision
 consistency, but only when decision involvement is low (vs. high)
 Further, when elaborate processing of the focal brand occurs, the choice behavior of low
involved participants may also change. However, the mechanism by which this occurs may be
different as compared to a limited processing situation. Inducing a person to think about one’s
attitude may produce beliefs that are evaluatively consistent with the prior attitude and this may
lead to more polarized attitudes (Tesser & Conlee, 1975). Therefore, deep cognitive elaboration
on the attitude towards a certain brand, may instigate a change in the attitude towards this brand.
If an attitude is positive, it may become more positive by selectively focusing on this option and
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therefore the chance that this option will be chosen may also increase (Posavac et al., 2002).
Brand preferences are especially likely to alter when involvement is low. Highly involving
attitudes are less likely to succumb to the influence of situationally accessible beliefs, while less
involving attitudes are to a relatively greater extent based on beliefs made contextually
accessible (Krosnick & Schuman, 1988; Lavine et al. 1998).  Based on this reasoning, the
authors expect that choice decisions will be altered when decision involvement is low, due to
extensive processing of the focal, not most preferred brand. While this expectation regarding the
effect of selective focus on choice after extensive processing is comparable to our expectation in
the case of limited processing, the attitudinal processes that underlie this effect may be different.
Extensive processing of the focal brand makes the attitude more extreme, and does not merely
increase the accessibility of the attitude toward the focal alternative. In short,
 H5a: Elaborate processing of a not most preferred, focal brand decreases attitude-decision
 consistency significantly more when decision involvement is low (vs. high)
 H5b: The decrease in attitude-decision consistency when involvement is low (vs. high), due
 to elaborate focusing on a not most preferred brand, is caused by a change in the attitude
 toward the focal option
This, of course, brings us back to the often-studied evaluative route to behavior change.
3.1 Method
Study 2 consisted of two phases, separated from each other by a 15-minute filler task. The
respondents started of with reporting their attitudes (towards the 14 charities) and their level of
involvement with decision making among charities. For the participants in the experimental
conditions, the second phase began with a selective focus manipulation, accompanied by
instructions on how to process the focal brand (limited vs. extensive). No selective focus
manipulation, and therefore also no processing instructions, were presented to the participants in
the control condition. Subsequently, all participants chose one charity to receive a donation. The
experiment was a 2 x 2 (+ control conditions) between-subjects design, with a manipulation of
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the level of processing at two levels (limited vs. extensive), and a distinction between two levels
of involvement (low involvement vs. high involvement).
 3.1.1 Participants
 To recruit participants for this study, 1000 participants of the university’s on-line panel
received an invitation to participate. In total 500 men (MAge = 36.6) and 500 women (MAge =
37.9), were contacted. Of these 184 participants, 70 men (response rate = 14%; MAge = 35.14)
and 114 women (response rate = 22.8%, MAge = 35.80), completed the on-line questionnaire. In
exchange for participating in the study they could win a movie ticket.
 3.1.2 Procedure and Manipulations
 The procedure was by and large the same as in Study 1. Again the experiment consisted of
two experimental phases, but these were now separated from each other by a 15-minute filler
task in stead of one entire week.
 First Experimental Phase. In the first part of the questionnaire all participants were addressed
with questions about their past donation behavior, their attitude towards charitable organizations
in general and their level of involvement with decision making among charities. In order to
measure decision involvement, participants had to respond to the 10-items from the Revised
Personal Involvement Inventory (Zaichkowsky, 1994). The median of the mean scores on this
measurement scale was further on used to divide the participants in a low and high involvement
group. Afterwards, participants indicated to which degree they knew each of the 14 charities
under study (that were also used in Study 1) and how positive or negative their attitude was
towards each of these charities on a 1-item 7-point Likert scale. Next, each participant composed
a top-3 of most preferred charities. To this end all 14 charities appeared on the screen and
participants had to click on their most preferred charity. On the next page the 13 remaining
charities appeared on the screen and participants were asked to click on their second most
preferred charitable organization. The same procedure was repeated one more time in order to
make a selection of the third most preferred charity. Afterwards, the participants answered to a
number of filler questions, which took them 15 minutes on average.
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Second Experimental Phase. Immediately after the filler task, the two experimental
manipulations took place. First, the computer program randomly assigned two third of the
participants to the experimental condition that received a selective focus manipulation, and
assigned the other third of the participants to the control condition. Subsequently, the computer
program split the experimental group, which received the selective focus manipulation, up in two
subgroups based on a manipulation of the degree of processing (limited vs. extensive). This
resulted in an experimental design with three conditions, i.e., a control condition, an
experimental condition with a limited level of processing of the focal brand and a condition with
an extensive level of processing of the focal brand. To this end, the participants in the
experimental conditions received the information that this research was not only investigating the
attitudes towards donation behavior and the different charities, but also the charities’ advertising
effectiveness. The instructions for the participants stated that a large number of existing print ads
were selected for each charity under investigation, but that each participant only had to look at
three ads for one charity. At this moment the participants in the experimental conditions in fact
received a selective focus manipulation in the form of a series of ads that depicted their second
most preferred charitable organization. They all looked at three fictitious ads, which only varied
across participants with respect to the organization name that was depicted. All three ads are
unrelated to the functions served by each charitable organization. For instance, one ad promoted
the ‘charity gift certificate’, which enables the receiver to donate the value of the gift certificate
to a charity of his/her preference. This ad then simply indicates that the focal ad can receive
donations through the use of this ‘charity gift certificate’. The participants in the control
condition skipped this part of the questionnaire and were not addressed with any selective focus
manipulation. Hence, this study contained a more realistic manipulation of selective focus, which
increases the value of the findings for practical applications.
 Furthermore, the participants in the experimental conditions also received instructions on
how to look at the information in the ads. At this moment the ‘degree of processing’
manipulation was inserted. This holds that half of the participants in the experimental condition
with extensive processing of the focal brand received the instructions to look at each ad carefully
and then report all the associations (at least 5) that popped up in their head while looking at the
ad. The participants in the other experimental condition were asked to count the number of times
the letter ‘a’ was depicted in the ad, and to select one of the three possible answers as fast as
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possible (Coates, Butler, & Berry, 2004). The manipulations for a ‘structural’ (a form of limited
processing) and ‘associative’ (a form of extensive processing) level of processing, that were used
by Obermiller (1985), served as a reference for the manipulations of the degree of processing
used in this study. Immediately after these manipulations, participants choose one charity that
was going to receive a substantial amount of money. Therefore, they typed in the name of the
charity, which they would like to receive the donation in the box that was depicted on the page.
Next, the participants in the experimental conditions who saw the ads, reported on the likeability
of the ads. This was assessed on a 3-item 7-point semantic differential scale, anchored by the
following adjectives: ‘not attractive-attractive’, ‘not appealing-appealing’, ‘bad-good’ (?Ad_1 =
.86; ?Ad_2 = .89; ?Ad_3 = .81). Next, the participants again responded to the 14 items that
measured the attitude towards each of the charities. At the end, respondents were thanked for
their participation and probed for suspicion. None of the respondents realized what the real goal
of the study was or expressed any suspicion with respect to the presented ads.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Preliminary analyses
Prior to analyzing the participants’ choice decisions, the time participants in the ‘limited level
of processing’ condition spent looking at the ads was investigated. The time spent, in
milliseconds, counting the occurrence of the letter ‘a’ in the advertisements was recorded for the
participants in the ‘limited level of processing’ condition, while the time participants spent listing
associations was recorded for the participants in the ‘extensive level of processing condition’.
Participants in the ‘limited level of processing’ condition spent significantly less time looking at
each of the three advertisements, compared to the participants in the ‘extensive level of
processing condition’ (Mad1_limited = 10198.26 vs. Mad1_extensive = 41525.06, t(128) = -6.49, p <
.001; Mad2_limited = 15977.42 vs. Mad2_extensive = 33686.34, t(128) = -3.912, p < .001; Mad3_limited =
6782.59 vs. Mad3_extensive = 21912.88, t(128) = -5.09, p < .001).
 Further, a binary variable ‘decision involvement’ was constructed in order to distinguish the
low from the high involved participants. To this end, the mean score for each participant on the
10 items of the Revised Personal Involvement Inventory (? = .92) was calculated (Zaichkowsky,
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1994). A participant was subsequently defined as being ‘lower involved’ when the mean score
was below the median and as ‘higher involved’ when the mean score was above the median
(Mlower_involvement = 4.33 vs. Mhigher_involvement = 5.99, t(190) = -19.87, p < .001)8.
 3.2.2 Attitude–Decision Consistency
 First, we investigated whether the results of Study 1, concerning the interaction between
involvement and selective focus, could be replicated. A ?²-test checked whether selective focus
alters attitude-decision (in)consistency when decision involvement is low, and not when decision
involvement is high. In effect, more participants made inconsistent choices due to the selective
focus manipulation when decision involvement was low (?²(1, N = 79) = 7.45, p = .006) versus
high (?²(1, N = 87) = .62, p = .433). Remarkably, in the control condition without a selective
focus manipulation, the high involved participants made slightly less consistent choices
compared to the low involved participants. This finding is in opposition with how decision
involvement generally affects choice consistence, it is not significant though. Table 2 presents an
overview of the percentages of inconsistent choices as a function of selective focus and decision
involvement.
Table 2. The Percentage of Participants Making Inconsistent Choices as a Function of
Decision Involvement, Selective Focus and the Degree of Processing (Study 2)
Selective Focus
No Selective
Focus
Selective Focus on  the Second Most Preferred
Alternative
Decision
Involvement
Overall Limited Brand
Processing
Extensive Brand
Processing
Low 17.9 % 49.0 % 50.0 % 48.4 %
High 25.8 % 33.9 % 34.3 % 33.3 %
8 The mean level of involvement for the ‘low involved’ participants is higher than the mean of the measurement
scale. Although, this is not surprising given the product category under study is ‘charitable organizations’, it is more
appropriate to distinguish between a ‘lower’ and a ‘higher’ involvement group in this study than to refer to a low vs.
high involvement group.
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 After establishing the validity of this finding, it was tested whether H4 could be confirmed by
the collected data. Does focusing on the second most preferred choice option also increase the
number of inconsistent choices for low involved participants, even if the attention given to the
focal brand was limited? The data appear to confirm this hypothesis. 50.0% of the low involved
participants in the limited brand processing condition made an inconsistent decision, while only
17.9% percent of the low involved participants in the control condition made an inconsistent
decision (?²(1, N = 48) = 5.61, p = .018). An equal number of high involved participants in the
control condition and in the experimental condition made an inconsistent decision (25.8% vs.
34.3%, ?²(1, N = 66) = .56, p = .454). These findings confirm H4.
 H5a expresses the expectation that the number of inconsistent choices will also increase for
low involved participants when the focal brand was processed extensively. Hence, two more ?²-
tests investigate whether an increased number of inconsistent choices can be perceived in the low
involvement group when a not most preferred brand is focused upon extensively prior to decision
making. The results indicate that also H5a can be confirmed. Low involved participants make
more inconsistent choices, after focusing their attention extensively on the second most preferred
brand (48.4%), compared to the low involved participants in the control condition (17.9%) (?²(1,
N = 59) = 6.12, p = .013). This while there is no difference in inconsistency for high involved
participants that did, or did not, process three ads for their second most preferred choice option
extensively (33.3% vs. 25.8%, ?²(1, N = 52) = .35, p = .557).
 Although the predicted outcome for limited and extensive processing of the focal brand in
terms of inconsistent choices was the same, this paper predicted the intervening processes to be
different. Extensively focusing on a not most preferred brand should not only increase the
accessibility of the attitude toward the focal alternative, but also the favorability of the focal
brand. This implies that respondents in the elaborate processing condition do not necessarily act
inconsistently by deciding on a previously not most favored choice option, when this option was
prompted to be selectively considered. Indeed, this choice option can have gained relative
standing in the consideration set. Consequently, respondents may be inconsistent with their
previously owned attitudes, but consistent with their recently obtained attitudes. In order to
further test this proposition, stated in H5b, a model in which the attitude toward the second most
preferred brand at the first and second choice instance was estimated based on the depth of
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processing and level of involvement, and the interaction of both variables. Overall, the attitude
toward the second most preferred brand does not change (F(1,185) = .94, p = .333). Yet, pairwise
comparisons that compare the initial absolute attitude towards the second most preferred choice
option to the second measurement of this attitude, and this for each group of participants formed
by a combination of the level of involvement (low vs. high) and the degree of processing (control
condition, limited processing and extensive processing) show that the attitude toward the second
most preferred brand did become more positive when low involved participants focused
extensively on this brand (F(1,185) = 4.65, p = .032). None of the other pairwise comparisons
was significant. Next, we estimated the absolute attitude toward the most preferred and second
most preferred brand at the second measurement moment, based on the depth of processing and
the level of involvement, and the interaction between both. Overall, the attitude toward the most
preferred brand does not significantly differ from the attitude toward the second most preferred
brand at the second measurement moment (F(1,185) = .00, p = .994). Yet further pairwise
comparisons do indicate that the second most preferred brand is evaluated significantly more
positively than the most preferred brand only when low involved participants focused
extensively on this brand (F(1,185) = 18.83, p < .001). In accordance with expectations, these
findings suggest that significant changes in the attitude toward the focal brand could have lead to
an increase in inconsistent choice only for low involved participants that processed this focal
brand extensively.
3.3 Discussion
 The results of this second experiment confirm the initial finding that both selective focus and
involvement interact in their influence on consumers’ choice decisions. A simple selective focus
manipulation alters the choice decisions of low involved participants, but not of high involved
participants. Furthermore, Study 2 extends the findings of the Study 1 by taking into account the
level of processing of the focal brand that is necessary in order to establish an alternate choice
decision. The findings indicate that elaborate processing of the focal brand is not a prerequisite
for a change in the choice decision to occur. Even a limited level of processing of the focal brand
can alter choice decisions. The underlying process by which this change is brought about,
however, is different in the limited versus elaborate processing situations. The results indicate
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that the focal brand is valued more positively, compared to the initial evaluation, after extensive
processing of the three ads for this brand. This finding is in line with the explanation for the
influence of selective focus on decision making that was proposed by Posavac et al. (2002). They
proposed and found evidence for the fact that respondents do not act inconsistently by deciding
on a previously not most favored choice option, when this option was prompted to be selectively
focused upon, because this choice option can have gained relative standing in the consideration
set. The results of this study can confirm their finding, but at the same time also nuance it,
because this process explanation does not hold for the participants that used limited processing of
the focal brands. Limited processing of the three ads for the focal brand did not lead to a change
in the preferences for this focal brand. This finding is in line with the findings of Nedungadi
(1990). In contrast with Posavac et al. (2002), Nedungadi (1990) showed that choice decisions
may be altered, without altering brand evaluations, through variation in the consideration of
brands. Study 2 reconciles the findings of both Posavac et al. (2002) and Nedungadi (1990). A
change in the choice behavior of low involved participants, due to selective focus, can occur
through two distinct mechanisms. When the focal brand is extensively processed, the attitude
towards this brand increases and this may result in an increased choice for this brand. However,
when the focal brand is only processed in a limited manner, brand choice is also significantly
altered, but this happens outside the traditional evaluation-based route.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
4.1 Theoretical Contributions
 The results of the two reported experiments clearly demonstrate that selective focus, together
with decision involvement, has important implications for the choices consumers make. The
results of prior studies on selective focus were not consistent. While some studies showed a clear
influence of selective focus on choice decisions, others found that the effect was limited to an
alteration of the consideration set (Posavac et al. 2002; Coates et al. 2004). Introducing decision
involvement as a possible moderator leads to a clearer understanding on how decision making is
influenced by selective focus. When involvement is low, simply focusing on a not most favored
brand can lead to a final choice of this brand. On the other hand, irrespective of brand focus,
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when decision involvement is high, consumers are very likely to retrieve their most preferred
brand and to rely on their previously formed attitudes to select the brand they really like the
most.
 Further, the consumer choice literature has frequently characterized the decision-making
process as involving at least two distinct stages, a brand consideration and a brand selection stage
(e.g., Nedungadi, 1990; Shocker et al., 1991; Suh, 2009). Given the attention devoted to
consideration sets in the consumer choice literature, it is important to assess the influence of
selective focus and decision involvement for both the brand consideration and brand selection
stage separately. In line with our expectations, the results showed that highly involved
participants, compared to less involved ones, were more likely to retrieve their most preferred
brand from memory. Further, results also revealed that selectively focusing on an alternative,
prior to choice, alters the composition of the consideration set. More specifically, selectively
focusing on a brand is likely to increase the chance that this brand will be retrieved from
memory, irrespective of the level of involvement with the decision. But, this effect of selective
focus will only transfer to brand selection in certain cases of decision involvement. Only when
decision involvement is low, the accessibility of an attitude may gain the upper hand over the
favorability of an attitude in the selection of a choice option.
 Finally, the Study 2 also investigated whether a more profound level of processing of the
focal brand was a precondition for the influence of selective focus to transfer through to brand
choice. The results indicate that both a lower and a deeper level of processing of the focal brand
can alter the choice decisions of low involved consumers. Although limited and extensive
processing of the focal brand lead to the same changes in the choice decisions, they do so by
different attitudinal mechanisms. While merely superficially attending the focal brand alters
choice decisions without changing the actual attitudes consumers hold, profound processing of
the focal brand is more likely to exert its influence on decision making by improving the
preferences for the focal brand. Consequently, in the latter instance, respondents can be regarded
as inconsistent with their previously owned attitudes, but consistent with their recently obtained
attitudes.
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 4.2 Managerial Implications
 First, investigating the effect of paying attention to marketing stimuli, presented in the
decision context, on decision making helps managers in their development of effective
communication strategies. Generating a positively valued brand has long time been the main
focus of marketing communications. Based on these findings, it is clear that generating a more
prominent brand may also be essential and have direct consequences for decision making,
especially when decision involvement is low. By merely being present in the consumers’
decision context, and attracting a limited level of attention, low involved consumers’ decision
making may be altered. Our findings also coincide with the ‘recency planning’ idea (Ephron,
1997). Ephron (1997) indicated that effective media planning is not only a case of ‘how many
times’ a consumer has to be reached, but also ‘when’ does a consumer have to be reached. The
results confirm that there is indeed a window of advertising opportunity preceding each
purchase. Most importantly, placing advertisements close to the point of sale may especially be
beneficial to alter the choice decisions of low involved consumers. Because of this, means of
communication that hold the potential of being placed close to or in the point of sale, such as
billboards and in-store floorboards etc., become very important in this respect (Taylor, Franke, &
Bang 2006).
 4.3 Limitations and Future Research
 The two conducted experiments used existing charitable organizations to enhance the
external validity. Consequently, the level of involvement was measured and not manipulated. For
future research, it may be interesting to see whether our findings can be replicated by
manipulating, rather than measuring, decision involvement.
 Second, in the reported experiments a ‘not most preferred’ choice option was still a ‘favored’
option. It might be taking it a bridge too far supposing that a disliked alternative may end up
getting chosen under conditions of low decision involvement, just because it is the most
accessible alternative. Slight indications in this direction can be found in Posavac et al. (2002).
They did not obtain an effect of selective focus when the initial attitude toward the focal
alternative was negative. But, they did not make a distinction between high and low decision
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involvement. Hence, further research is also needed to find out how far the influence of selective
focus on a not favored brand might reach under differential conditions of decision involvement.
 Further, in order to control the selective exposure and the level of attention paid to the focal
brand the propositions were tested in two experiments. In fact, much of the current theoretical
work on low involvement processing and low attention advertising effects is based on
experimental findings (Grimes, 2008). Therefore, along with Grimes (2008) the authors plead for
an exploration of this emerging and important area with applied consumer research of all types.
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CHAPTER IV: LOOKING DOWN IS THE WAY UP – THE INFLUENCE OF THE
VERTICAL DIRECTION OF ATTENTION ON THE EVOKED PROCESSING STYLE
As nearby objects tend to be available in the lower visual field, whereas distant objects tend
to be available in the upper visual field, people generally look down to attend to nearby objects
and look up to attend to objects further away. In addition, according to Construal Level Theory,
people construe spatially near objects in a more concrete sense, whereas spatially distant objects
are construed in a broader, abstract sense. In line with an embodied view on cognition this paper
posits that the association between the looking down or up and the level at which the perceived
objects are construed may have become overgeneralized, leading to objects being construed at a
lower level when looking down and at a higher level when looking up. Four experiments
demonstrate that the vertical direction of attention affects outcomes that generally tend to vary
with the level of construal. Specifically, looking down leads to slower product category-
identification latencies of competing brands (Experiment 1), more inclusive (Experiment 2) and
broader (Experiment 3) product categorizations and a higher level of preference-decision
correspondence (Experiment 4).
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 Assume that one store displays the brands of your choice set on a high shelf and another store
displays the same brands on a low shelf. Would this difference in shelf height affect which brand
you ultimately choose? Would you pay differential attention to an ad that is placed on the store
floor as compared to this same ad being attached to the store ceiling? Or, would your purchases
from an on-line retail store be influenced by the height at which your computer monitor is
placed? We argue that this is indeed the case. By means of four studies this paper develops an
initial understanding of how processing stimuli placed in lower vertical positions differs from
processing stimuli in higher vertical positions.
 Attending to low versus high placed products implies looking down versus up. Because
nearby objects are generally situated in the lower visual field while distant objects are generally
situated in the upper visual field (Previc, 1990), people are more used to looking up to process
distant objects than nearby objects, and they are more used to looking down to process nearby
objects than distant objects. Consequently, due to their frequent co-occurrence, looking up and
distance, and looking down and proximity may be strongly associated in people’s minds.
According to the embodied cognition perspective, bodily movements (i.e., looking down/up) and
bodily sensations along with their associations may serve as important inputs in cognition and
may instigate a different processing strategy (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Labroo & Nielsen, 2010;
Meyers-Levy, Zhu & Jiang, 2010; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber & Ric,
2005).
 Concerning processing styles, Construal Level Theory suggests that distant stimuli are
represented by higher-level, abstract conceptual construals because they are processed with a
broader conceptual scope, whereas proximate stimuli are represented by lower-level, concrete
conceptual construals because they are processed with a narrower conceptual scope (Förster,
2009; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Prior research on Construal Level Theory illustrates that this
distance concept is multi-faceted and that spatial distance, temporal distance, social distance and
hypotheticallity, all exert a similar influence on the level of conceptual construal (Trope &
Liberman, 2003, 2010; Trope, Liberman & Wakslak, 2007).
 This paper proposes that also the placement of objects in vertical space induces a broader or
more focused type of processing. More specifically, we argue that because of the association
between looking up and distance, looking up may automatically activate a higher, more abstract
level of construal. Hence, merely looking up may broaden the scope of conceptual processing.
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Alternatively, looking down might narrow the scope of conceptual processing, because this type
of processing is generally associated with a more concrete level of construal and is generally
seen as more appropriate to process nearby objects.
 Embracing an embodied view on cognition and drawing on Construal Level Theory, this
paper proposes that the association between the perception of nearby (distant) objects in the
lower visual field and a narrow (broad) processing strategy may have become overgeneralized,
giving rise to an association between merely looking down (up) and a narrow (broad) processing
style. In support of our central hypothesis that merely attending to products placed in a lower as
compared to a higher vertical position evokes in itself a different processing style, this paper
illustrates that having respondents look up or down instigates a difference in consumers’ access
to competing brands (Study 1), leads to a different categorization of brands (Studies 2 and 3),
and results in different brand choices and preference-decision correspondence (Study 4).
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
 An emerging stream of literature on situational cognition emphasizes that a multitude of
contextual elements influences the accessibility and use of information (Schwarz, 2006). In line
with this, the embodied cognition perspective suggests that bodily sensations, as an example of
situational cognition, may serve as an important informative input (Markman & Brendl, 2005).
Specifically, inducing a bodily movement is likely to evoke those cognitions normally associated
with the bodily movement. These cognitions are subsequently likely to guide evaluative
judgments. For instance, people generally approach what feels positive and avoid what feels
negative. Therefore, in people’s mind, approach behavior may be inherently tied to positive
stimuli whereas avoidance behavior may be inherently tied to the negativity of stimuli. Due to
the existence of these associations, merely performing approach movements (e.g., arm flexions)
may result in more positive attitudes regarding a stimulus whereas performing avoidance
movements (e.g., arm extensions) can lead to a more negative attitude (Cacioppo, Priester &
Berntson, 1993). Approaching positive environmental stimuli or avoiding negative
environmental stimuli is one of the most fundamental of human behaviors (Higgins, 1997).
However, research has also shown that less fundamental, culturally learned bodily movements
can be embodied. For example, people who extended their middle finger subsequently rated an
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ambiguously hostile target as more aggressive than did people who extended their index finger
(Chandler & Schwarz, 2009). Overall, the activation of bodily movements sends bodily feedback
that informs individuals.
 Besides influencing people’s evaluative judgments (Labroo & Nielsen, 2010), bodily
sensations may also impact the evoked processing style (Friedman & Förster, 2000, 2002;
Förster, Friedman, Özelsel & Denzler, 2006). Bodily movements may inform individuals about
the processing requirements of a situation. Hence, bodily movements are likely to be associated
with certain processing styles. For example, arm flexion (vs. arm extension) informs individuals
that a situation is benign (vs. problematic), leading to the adoption of a carefree, heuristic
processing style rather than a perseverant systematic processing style (Friedman & Förster,
2000). Hence, just as internal affective states as happiness and sadness inform individuals about
the nature of their current situations and the responses that are appropriate in these situations, so
do bodily sensations. By means of association, these sensations have become to convey to
individuals the processing requirements of the current situation.
 This embodied cognition perspective also suggests that different processing styles may be
evoked by attending to objects placed lower versus higher on the vertical dimension of space,
because low placed objects often require different processing than high placed objects.
Specifically, objects placed lower in the visual field tend to be proximate, whereas objects
situated in the upper visual field tend to be more distant. Construal Level Theory suggests that
objects that are psychologically distant are conceptualized in a more abstract manner, whereas
psychologically proximate objects are conceptualized in a more concrete manner. Several studies
within the framework of CLT have already demonstrated this effect. For instance, Kardes,
Cronley and Kim (2006) manipulated distance by showing respondents either brands that were
physically present or pictures of these same brands. They found that the mere presence of a set of
target brands at the time a choice is made encourages consumers to represent the brands in
memory in terms of concrete lower-level construals. The representation that is formed of the
brands is therefore likely to contain many important contextual details. Because judgments based
on a large amount of greater contextual detail are held with greater confidence (Gill, Swann &
Silvera, 1998), lower level construals of brand preferences were suggested to be more stable over
time. Indeed, preference stability and preference-behavior consistency appeared higher when the
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brands in the choice set were physically present, rather than being merely presented by means of
a picture (Kardes, Cronley & Kim, 2006).
 Cognitive psychologists have shown that differences in people’s scope of attention tend to
produce these different levels of construal in response to psychological distance (Förster, 2009;
Förster, Liberman & Kuschel, 2008). The scope of attention has both a perceptual and
conceptual component. First, the scope of perceptual attention, refers to the breadth of attention
directed to external visual stimuli (i.e., the extent to which attention is focused upon central as
opposed to peripheral environmental cues). A narrower scope of visual attention is selective,
filtering out irrelevant stimuli and attending more to perceptual details, whereas a broader scope
of attention is likely to impair the selectivity of perceptual attention, leading to increased
attending to different (distracting) external elements and to the global perceptual structure of
objects (Rowe, Hirsh & Anderson, 2007). The scope of perceptual attention tends to be broader
with increasing psychological distance. For instance, when people are presented with a large
letter that is composed of smaller representations of a different letter (e.g., a large letter H made
up of several small letters L), people can more easily detect global perceptual elements (i.e., the
large letter H) after being primed with spatial distance. At the same time, this prime impedes the
perception of local elements (i.e., the small letters L) (Liberman & Förster, 2009).
 Second and more importantly, changes in psychological distance also tend to trigger changes
in the scope of conceptual attention (Liberman & Förster, 2009). The scope of conceptual
attention then refers to the extent of the internal semantic search upon attending to a focal object
(Anderson & Neely, 1996; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel & Denzler, 2006; Rowe, Hirsh &
Anderson, 2007). The scope of conceptual attention is conceived of as the breadth of semantic
access. Hence, a narrower scope of conceptual attention restricts the activation of mental
representations to those with the highest accessibility in a given context (e.g., the primed
category and its dominant semantic associates; such as a car and a bus as types of transport),
whereas a broader scope of conceptual attention is conceived of as expanding the range of
activation to additional target representations with lower a priori accessibility (e.g., remote
semantic associates; such as a camel as a type of transport) (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel &
Denzler, 2006). This paper will focus on the conceptual scope of attention and how it is
influenced by the vertical direction of attention.
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  Specifically, this paper proposes that looking up or down is likely to be associated with a
different scope of conceptual attention because these movements typically go together with
observing and processing objects that are either distant or proximate.  Essentially, we posit that
merely directing attention up- or downward may come to serve as an associative prime, eliciting
attentional broadening or narrowing that is otherwise only triggered when processing objects at
different distances. This proposition is investigated by registering the influence of looking up
versus down on a diverse set of dependent variables that are likely to be influenced by the scope
of conceptual attention. Specifically, a series of four studies illustrates that whether inducing
participants to look down rather than up leads to (1) inhibition of competing brands (Study 1);
(2) less inclusive brand categorizations, meaning that less brands are considered as representative
for the product category (Study 2); (3) narrower brand categorizations in the sense that brands
are categorized in larger number of smaller categories (Study 3), and (4) a higher level of
preference-behavior consistency (Study 4).
2. STUDY 1: LOOKING DOWN AS AN INHIBITOR OF COMPETING BRANDS
  Study 1 investigates if looking down (up) while processing a target brand inhibits (increases)
the accessibility of other brands in the same product category. When a target item is conceptually
focused upon, the internal spotlight of attention is momentarily narrowed upon the representation
of the focal item, which has been suggested to lead to the inhibition of semantically related items
not in the spotlight of this attention (Anderson & Spellman, 1995).  Processing information on a
target brand with a narrow conceptual scope activates richer and more elaborate representations
of the specific brand which suppresses the retrieval of brands that are not presented (Kardes,
Cronley & Kim, 2006). Inhibition suppresses related concepts and makes them more difficult to
retrieve from memory (Anderson, 2003). Inasmuch as looking down to process information on a
target brand is likely to evoke a narrow processing style, we expect that this may result in a
decreased accessibility of other brands in the same product category. Alternatively, processing
information on a target brand with a broad conceptual scope is likely to increase access to other
brands in the product category.
 This hypothesis was evaluated using product category-identification latencies. We predicted
that category-identification latencies would be longer for related brands when the target brand
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was presented in a low (versus eye-level) vertical position. Alternatively, we predicted category-
identification latencies to be shorter for related brands when the target brand was presented in a
high (versus eye-level) vertical position. To test these predictions, the category-identification
latencies obtained from participants that processed the target brand when it was presented at eye-
level, served as the standard of comparison.
  2.1 Method
 Participants consisted of 93 (39 men and 54 women) undergraduates. A between-subjects
design with three conditions (Presentation height of the target brand: Low vs. Medium vs. High)
was employed. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine how people
perceive different brands. Participants then received information about the target brand Lindt
Swiss Chocolate. This information was conveyed by a slideshow with pictures of the packaging
of different varieties and several slogans and ads. This slideshow was either projected on a low,
middle, or high position on the white wall in front of the participants.
  A computer-based product category-identification task was subsequently administered, and
participants were asked to press a button labeled ‘chocolate brand’ for brands of chocolate
products and to press a button labeled ‘non-chocolate brand’ for other products. Speed and
especially accuracy were emphasized and response latencies were recorded by the computer. The
following brand names were presented on the computer monitor in a random order: Cote d’or,
Jacques, Callebaut, Milka, Toblerone, Levi’s, Ford, Adidas, Samsung, and Dreft.
  2.2 Results and Discussion
  Because the measurement of the brands’ accessibilities is nested within participants, a
multilevel regression analysis, with the presentation height and product category (chocolate
brands versus non-chocolate brands) as the independent variables and the response latencies as
the dependent variable, was run. Analyzing the data with a multilevel regression model accounts
for individual-level differences in response speed. The mean estimated product category-
identification latencies are presented in Table 1 as a function of the product category and
presentation height.
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 Table 1. Mean Estimated Product Category-identification Latencies (in Milliseconds)
 as a Function of Product Category and Presentation Height
Presentation Height
Product Category Low Medium High
Chocolate
Brand
1307.69 1092.06 830.08
Non-chocolate
Brand
955.36 933.67 929.37
  The multilevel model indicates a significant main effect of the product category (F(1,837) =
10.427, p = .001), and a marginally significant main effect of presentation height (F(2,93) =
2.591, p = .080). More importantly, it also suggests a significant interaction effect between the
presentation height and the product category (F(2,837) = 9.781, p < .001) (see Figure 1).
 Figure 1. Interaction Effect between Presentation Height and Product Category
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 Simple effect tests indicate a significant difference between presentation height conditions,
within the chocolate product category (F(2,136.32) = 7.689, p = .001), but not within the non-
chocolate product category (F(2,136.32) = .026, p = .974). Further pairwise comparisons indicate
that for the chocolate brands response latencies tended to be longer when the target brand
information was presented on a low versus medium height (MDiff_Low_Medium = 215.64, SE =
124.029, p = .084), whereas response latencies tended to be shorter when the target brand
information was presented on a high versus medium height (MDiff_Medium_High = 261.978, SE =
125.886, p = .039). The time to classify non-chocolate bars, however, did not differ when the
target brand information was presented on a low versus medium height (MDiff_Low_Medium =
21.695, SE = 124.029, p = .861), nor when the information was presented on a high versus
medium height (MDiff_Medium_High = 4.295, SE = 125.886, p = .973). These findings show that
processing brand information presented in the lower versus higher visual field inhibits the
retrieval of brands related to the target brand, but does not influence the retrieval of non-related
brands from a different product category.
  This pattern suggests that lower brand presentations suppress the activation of related brands.
The second and third study elaborate on these findings by showing that the effect of the
presentation height of target information is not limited to differences in activation, but also
instigates a difference in the categorization process. Differences in the construction of narrow
versus broad product categories have been shown to play an important role in brand choice,
perceived decision difficulty, decision time, satisfaction with the assortment, and consumption
quantity (Ülkümen, Chakravarti, and Morwitz, 2010). Consequently, investigating how different
processing styles, associated with looking up or down, may influence the consumers’
categorization process is of great importance.
3. STUDY 2: DEGREE OF PROTOTYPICALITY OF LESS PROTOTYPICAL BRANDS
WITHIN A PRODUCT CATEGORY
 Broadening the scope of conceptual attention is likely to result in a stronger degree of
perceived relatedness among stimuli. In particular, activation of a product category typically
spreads to the most similar and most prototypical brands within a product category (Hutchinson,
1983; Gruenewald & Lockhead, 1980; Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 1985). When the conceptual
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scope of attention broadens, spreading of activation is expanded. Consequently, the likelihood
that less prototypical brands receive activation increases. An increased level of activation of less
prototypical brands that results from accessing a category increases the probability that these
brands will be classified in the category (Lajos, Katona, Chattopadhyay & Sarvary, 2009).
Consequently, atypical brands may be more likely to be judged as belonging to a certain product
category. In contrast, narrowing the scope of conceptual attention is likely to prevent activation
of relatively inaccessible features shared between fringe exemplars and other category members;
reducing the ability to detect similarities between less prototypical and more prototypical
exemplars (Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990). Several studies drawing upon Construal Level
Theory have already indicated that the inclusion of fringe examples into categories is more likely
when construal-level is broad rather than narrow. Thinking more concretely or abstractly,
however, should not affect ratings of typical exemplars (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman & Alony,
2006). Consequently, the main aim of study 2 is to show that looking down or up has an
influence on the likelihood that atypical items will be designated as members of a product
category. Specifically, study 2 was designed to test whether presenting information in the upper
versus lower visual field increases the likelihood that less prototypical brands are accepted as
members of a product category
 3.1 Method
 Subjects were the same 93 undergraduate students that participated in Study 1. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. As in Study 1, the position on the vertical
dimension at which the target information was presented was the manipulated factor in this
study. Participants were asked to rate the prototypicality of brands for a product category, by
scoring them on a 9-point Likert scale, when the brands were projected on a low, medium or
high position on the white wall in front of the participants. Hence, participants were induced to
look down, look up or straight ahead when attending to the focal information. Pictures of 15
brands were one by one projected on the positions corresponding with their respective
conditions. Prior to projecting the brands, the participants were presented with a standard
description of the product category ‘candy bars’. They read that candy bars are “a form of
confectionery, usually packaged in a bar or log form, often coated with chocolate, and sized as a
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snack for one person. But within this term, a wide variety of products exists.” The presented
brands ranged from traditional chocolate candy bars over granola bars, chocolate bars, single-
packaged cookies, to other sweets.
 3.2 Results and Discussion
 To investigate whether looking up (down) indeed broadens (narrows) the scope of conceptual
attention, which leads to including more (less) atypical brands into a product category, we first
investigate the prototypicality scores for each brand. Figure 2 depicts these average scores for
each brand, separately for each condition, with the brands rank ordered from the highest to the
lowest prototypicality scores. The brands Twix, Mars, Snickers, Milky Way, Balisto, Kinder
Bueno and Bounty are perceived as more prototypical of the product category ‘candy bars’ than
the brands Cote d’or, M&M’s, Suzy, Maltesers, Tuc, Sultana, Mentos and Lutti. This perception
confers with the definition of candy bars as those brands seen as prototypical all comprise the
typical elements of a candy bar (i.e., a bar or log form, coated with chocolate, and sized as a
snack for one person). Those brands seen as less prototypical fail on at least one criterion.
 Figure 2. Mean Observed Prototypicality Scores According to Presentation Height
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 Looking at Figure 2 clarifies that whereas no differences in the prototypicality scores can be
observed for those brands that are seen as highly prototypical, the scores significantly differ
across conditions for less prototypical brands. A repeated measures anova, with the brand
prototypicality scores as a within-subjects variable, and the presentation height as a between-
subjects variable, points to a significant interaction effect (F(28) = 1.496, p = .032). The results
of the pairwise comparisons, comparing the low presentation height to the medium presentation
height and the medium to the high presentation height for every brand are presented in Appendix
1. Comparing the mean scores across all brands clarifies that the scores significantly differ
between conditions. For less prototypical brands goes that looking up leads to significantly
higher scores than looking ahead, whereas looking down leads to significantly lower scores
compared to looking ahead. The ratings of highly prototypical brands do not differ according to
presentation height. These findings provide additional evidence for the fact that looking down
might narrow the conceptual scope of attention while looking up might broaden it.
4. STUDY 3: CATEGORIZATION OF ITEMS
  The scope of conceptual attention is also likely to affect how consumers categorize brands,
that is in how many different product categories they classify a given set of brands. As the main
goal of categorization is to create a categorical structure that maximizes the similarity of objects
within each category while simultaneously minimizing the similarity with objects from different
categories (Lajos, Katona, Chattopadhyay & Sarvary, 2009), narrower product categories are
likely to be construed when the attentional scope is narrow. Fewer features shared between
category members are likely to be activated, reducing the ability to detect similarities between
brands. Therefore, fewer brands are likely to receive activation when searching for similar
brands. Hence, less inclusive categorization is likely to emerge when the conceptual scope of
attention is narrowed because working memory access to shared exemplar features is constrained
(Isen & Daubman, 1984). In line with this reasoning, prior research has already shown that
construing concepts in broader, abstract terms leads to more inclusive categorization processes
(Liberman, Sagistrano & Trope, 2002; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman & Alony, 2006).
 Hence, study 3 further investigates whether the outcome of the categorization process differs
according to the presentation height of the to-be-categorized items in the upper or lower visual
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field. Specifically, categorization is expected to be narrower, that is brands are expected to be
assigned to more product categories when brands are positioned in the lower rather than upper
visual field.
 4.1 Method
 One hundred and seven undergraduate students at a large European University (32 men, 75
women) participated in the study in exchange for partial course credit. As in the previous studies,
the only manipulated variable was the placement of the target stimuli on the vertical dimension.
In the present experiment, the presentation height was varied by adjusting the height of the desk
on which the computer monitor was placed. Either the computer screen was placed below or
above eye-level of the seated participants. The angle from which participants looked up or down
was comparable in both conditions. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated in an
isolated cubicle in front of the computer screen. The screen depicted 20 pictures of items
generally found in retail stores and instructed the participants to categorize the items by
assigning each item to a category. Twenty empty boxes, each representing a category, were
presented on the screen. The participants then assigned items to groups by placing them in a box.
The participants were informed they could assign the depicted items to as much categories as
they wanted. Hence, they were explicitly instructed to group items together in as many categories
as they deemed appropriate.
 4.2 Results and Discussion
 Merely counting the number of product categories that were construed by the participants
points to substantial differences. When looking up, the mean number of categories to which the
items were assigned was 5.84, whereas the mean number of categories amounted to 7.24 when
participants looked down while performing the task (t(105) = 3.530, p = .001). This finding
confirms that a manipulation as simple as inducing participants to look up or down results in a
broader versus narrower categorization process.
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5. STUDY 4: BRAND CHOICE FROM LOW VERSUS HIGH SHELVES
 Brand choices are likely to be influenced by attentional focusing. When attention is narrow-
focused during choice, brands are likely to be represented with rich contextual detail – including
specific attributes and benefits; affective, cognitive and behavioral responses associated with the
brand; and the contexts in which these responses occur. These representations, as opposed to
broader, more superficial representations, are more likely to reflect consumers’ initial
preferences (Kardes, Cronley & Kim, 2006). Consequently, greater preference-behavior
consistency should be observed when brands are placed in a lower rather than higher position.
Furthermore, lower placed brands should also elicit more intense behavioral responses.
Preferences based on a large amount of contextual detail are likely to be held with greater
confidence (Gill, Swan & Silvera, 1998). Hence, when conceptual attention is narrow, that is
when brands are placed in a lower position, brand choices are likely to be more outspoken,
whereas when conceptual attention is broad, brand choices may be spread out more evenly
across all choice alternatives. To investigate whether looking up or down affects the degree of
preference-decision consistency and the spreading of choices across choice alternatives, all
products were either placed on a high or low shelf and participants were instructed to choose a
brand from the shelf. Hence, study 4 investigates real choice behavior in a final test of the
influence of looking up or down on consumer behavior.
 5.1 Method
 Participants consisted of 115 undergraduate students. Students participated in a 50 minutes
experimental session and received seven euro in return for their participation. This experimental
session comprised several tasks, of which only the first and the last are of interest to this study.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated in isolated cubicles in front of a computer
of which the screen was placed at eye-level. In the first task, participants were asked to rank
order 5 well-known confectionery brands (i.e., M&M’s, Maltesers, Mars, Tic Tac, Smarties)
according to their preferences. They were asked to place their most preferred brand at the first
and their least preferred brand at the fifth position.
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 After completing a number of unrelated questionnaires, the participants were asked to
complete a final choice task. In this choice task participants were placed in front of three shelves.
The middle shelve was at eye-level and always empty. The confectionery treats were placed on
the highest shelf and five types of soft drinks were placed on the lowest shelf, or vice versa.
Participants were informed that they could choose one of the presented products. To decide from
which shelve they were to choose, they had to draw an envelope containing a number. The
participants were led to believe that they had an equal chance of drawing number one, two or
three. In reality, however, the envelopes always contained the number of the shelf on which the
confectionery treats were placed. This was done to cover up the fact that we wanted to
investigate the influence of the vertical positioning of brands. Hence, the experimental design
comprises two conditions: participants chose a confectionery brand when all confectionery
brands were displayed either on the lowest or the highest of three shelves. At the end of the
experiment participants were asked to report their length. This was done because a participants’
length may restrain the influence of looking up or down. Specifically, large participants may
have to look up to a shelf under a different angle than small participants.
 The participants’ brand choices are used as a dependent variable in two manners. First, this
study investigates how choosing from a low or high shelf influences preference-behavior
correspondence. Preference-behavior correspondence is defined as the proportion of participants
who selects the same brand at the choice stage that they had reported preferring at the preference
formation stage. Choice dispersion serves as a second dependent variable. Choice dispersion
refers to the variability in brand choices and is found by computing a coefficient of
unalikeability. Specifically, the concept of unalikeability focuses on how often observations
differ from one another (Kader & Perry, 2007) and reflects the proportion of possible pairings of
two observations which are unalike. Specifically, when more responses are alike (in the same
category) then the variability in categorical choices is low, whereas when responses are spread
out more evenly across choice options variability tends to increase.
 5.2 Results and Discussion
 The proportion of participants who selected the same brand at the choice stage that they had
reported preferring initially is (marginally) significantly influenced by the placement of the
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brands at a high or low shelf. Preference-behavior correspondence was greater when participants
chose from a product category that was presented on a low (49.2%) rather than a high shelf
(33.3%) (Wald ?² = 3.24, p = .072). The length of the respondents did not confound this result as
it was an insignificant covariate (Wald ?² = .68, p = .409). This finding indicates that processing
lower-placed stimuli leads to more consistent behavioral responses.
 In addition, participants’ brand choices are spread out more evenly across all brands when
participants choose from a high, rather than a low shelf, as is shown in Table 2. By computing a
coefficient of unalikeability we determine the variability in the choice decisions in both
conditions (see Appendix 2 for a more detailed description of this coefficient of unalikeability).
The diversity in the preferences for the five brands, or the percentage of unalike choices, does
not initially differ between the low (24.67%) and high (24.69%) presentation height conditions (z
= -.12, p = .45). Comparing both proportions of unalike choices in the final choice decisions,
however, indicates a larger diversity in the responses of respondents in the high presentation
height condition (77.71%) compared to those in the low presentation height condition (67.06%).
These proportions of unalike responses are significantly different from each other (z = -6.70, p <
.001).
 Table 2. Confectionery Market Shares by Presentation Height
Shelf
Height
N M&M’s Maltesers Smarties Mars Tic Tac
Low 61 47.5% 27.9% 9.8% 6.6% 8.2%
High 54 31.5% 22.2% 18.5% 16.7% 11.1%
Total 115 40.0% 25.2% 13.9% 11.3% 9.6%
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
 This article identified differences in consumer responses to low versus high placed brands.
Four studies show that attending to brands while looking down prompts consumers to process
these brands in a more narrow sense. A narrower scope of conceptual attention leads to a more
in-depth focus on the target brand, which results in inhibition in the retrieval of competing
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brands (Study 1). Furthermore, the narrower conceptualization of lower placed brands affects
consumers’ categorization process. They judge brands as being less prototypical of a product
category (Study 2) and assign brands to more different, less inclusive product categories (Study
3). As a narrower conceptualization facilitates preference activation (Kardes, Cronley & Kim,
2006), looking down versus up also has consequences for brand choices. Specifically, a final
study shows that choosing from products placed on a lower shelf differs from choosing from
products placed on a higher shelf. Preference-behavior correspondence is higher when looking
down during brand choice. Choices are also less equally dispersed across choice options when
participants choose a brand from a low compared to a high shelf.
 While prior research addressing vertical position effects largely focused on differential levels
of attention paid to objects in different vertical positions (Goodrich, 2010), these results highlight
the importance of conceptual construal and the scope of conceptual processing in addressing
vertical position effects. Specifically, prior research departs from the premise that people have a
natural tendency to look down. They are likely to devote greater attention to stimuli in the lower
visual field than in the upper visual field. In line with this proposition, Goodrich (2010)
examined the effect of on-line ad location and demonstrated that lower page placement
significantly increased ad attention. However, increased attention alone often is not sufficient to
affect consumers’ choices (Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow & Young, 2009). Therefore the
reported results are important because processing stimuli in a more narrow or broad sense is
likely to alter brand choices.
 The reported results also highlight the importance of the conceptual scope of attention for
understanding the extent of activation and inhibition processes. This article focuses on
investigating the conceptual scope of attention, a concept which has been largely ignored by
consumer behavior researchers as a vital element in studies relying on spreading on activation as
a theoretical framework. Given that a large body of consumer behavior research relies on
accessibility theory and spreading of activation from one concept to another to account for
numerous findings, the reported results are important and the conceptual scope of attention
should be accounted for in future research. For instance, two of these well-researched findings
relating to brand accessibility are the indirect priming effect (Nedungadi, 1990) and part-
category inhibition (Alba & Chattopadhyay, 1985). The indirect priming effect refers to the
increased likelihood of retrieving a competing brand from the same subcategory as the primed
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brand. When priming a brand name, not only the brand name becomes more accessible, but
activation spreads to the subcategory node and activates the major brands within this subcategory
(Nedungadi, 1990). Part-category cuing inhibition, on the other hand, describes how presenting a
subset of brands may result in inhibited recall of the remaining brands (Alba & Chattopadhyay,
1985). We propose that a broader conceptual scope, evoked by inducing people to look up rather
than down, may reinforce the indirect priming effect and attenuate part-category cuing inhibition.
 Taken together, the reported studies provide substantial evidence that consumer behavior can
differ markedly depending on whether attention is directed up- or downward. These findings are
of considerable practical importance. Based on the reported findings, we identified advantages
that are associated with lower shelf placement. Brand choices are more in line with brand
preferences, and market share of the market leader is likely to be higher, when the brands are
presented in low rather than high positions. Other considerations, however, such as the amount
of attention devoted to objects dependent on their position on the shelf, and the position-based
inferences of consumers when attending low versus high placed brand, should also be taken into
account when deciding upon the position of a brand on the shelf.
 Our findings regarding the vertical placement of objects may not only be relevant in
decisions relating to the position of a brand on the shelf, but may also be important in internet
commerce settings. When making on-line purchases, consumers are seated in front of a computer
screen. As our studies have shown the height at which a computer monitor is placed may have an
influence on consumers’ conceptual scope of attention, purchase decisions may differ according
to the height of consumers’ computer screen. In addition, our results also suggest difference in
the effectiveness of in-store ads attached to the store ceiling, versus floorboards that are attached
to the store floor. Building on the current findings, floor-level advertising might be more
effective as the activation of the advertised brand may lead to the inhibition of competing brands.
 Further, our findings may also have practical implications for researchers. At some stages of
our work a broader scope of attention might be more appropriate than a narrow scope of
attention. For instance, when brainstorming about a novel project researchers may benefit from
adopting a broader scope of attention, while a narrow scope may be more appropriate when
proofreading a paper prior to submission. Hence, researchers are advised to lean back in their
chairs and look up when contemplating on new research ideas. They might lower their computer
screen to look down on their work when revising it prior to submission.
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8. APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Pairwise Comparisons of the Three Presentation Height Conditions for Each
Brand’s Mean Estimated Prototypicality
Brands
Presentation
Height (I)
Presentation
Height (J)
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error p-Value
Twix Low High -.094 .173 .589
Low Medium -.028 .176 .873
Medium High -.066 .179 .714
Mars Low High -.105 .201 .604
Low Medium -.120 .205 .559
Medium High .015 .208 .940
Snickers Low High .055 .168 .745
Low Medium -.004 .171 .983
Medium High .058 .173 .737
Milky Way Low High -.713 .257 .007
Low Medium -.318 .262 .227
Medium High -.395 .265 .139
Balisto Low High -1.049 .391 .008
Low Medium -.449 .398 .261
Medium High -.599 .404 .140
Kinder Bueno Low High -1.098 .404 .008
Low Medium -.588 .411 .155
Medium High -.509 .417 .224
Bounty Low High -.645 .286 .027
Low Medium -.103 .291 .723
Medium High -.542 .296 .070
Cote d'Or Low High -1.588 .377 < .001
Low Medium -1.086 .384 .005
Medium High -.503 .390 .200
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Brands
Presentation
Height (I)
Presentation
Height (J)
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
M&M's Low High -.638 .289 .030
Low Medium -.572 .294 .055
Medium High -.067 .298 .823
Suzy Low High -.180 .295 .543
Low Medium -.107 .300 .718
Medium High -.071 .305 .816
Maltesers Low High -1.068 .432 .015
Low Medium -.876 .481 .072
Medium High -.340 .489 .488
Tuc Low High -.801 .351 .025
Low Medium -.353 .440 .424
Medium High -.715 .446 .112
Sultana Low High -.401 .357 .264
Low Medium -.401 .357 .264
Medium High -.399 .363 .274
Mentos Low High -1.463 .427 < .001
Low Medium -.715 .435 .104
Medium High -.749 .441 .093
Lutti Low High -1.209 .333 < .001
Low Medium -.585 .339 .088
Medium High -.624 .344 .073
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 Appendix 2. Unalikeability Measure used in Study 4
For the case of a finite number of observations (n), a finite number of categories (m) and a finite
number of objects, ki, within Category i, the coefficient of unalikeability can be expressed as:
The interpretation of u2 is that it represents the proportion of possible comparisons (pairings)
which are unalike. Consider the following data for which we compute u2 as an example:
Ten respondents were asked to choose one out of three possible candy bars (bar A, B, or C); two
of them choose candy bar A, three choose candy bar B, and five choose candy bar C. Setting out
all possible pairings of responses in a table in which table entries are either 1 or 0 to indicate
whether the responses are unalike or alike, respectively, results in the following table:
 Incidence of Differences for the Outcomes of a Categorical Variabble
 A A B B B C C C C C
A 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
B 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
B 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
C 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
C 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
C 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
C 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
C 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
The sum of the 1’s in this table can be determined by:
 (2*3 + 2*5) + (3*2 + 3*5) + (5*2 + 5*3) = 2(2*3 + 2*5 + 3*5)
Thus:
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
 The main objective of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the role of
knowledge accessibility in consumer behavior by focusing on different determinants of
knowledge accessibility and their associated properties. In what follows, we first provide an
overview of how the investigated determinants of knowledge accessibility affect different
behavioral responses by summarizing the core findings of each chapter. Afterwards, we distil
general conclusions across all chapters by providing a reflective view on the implications of our
findings for consumer behavior and identifying limitations and opportunities for further research.
1. RECAPITULATION OF FINDINGS
 Chapter II focused on motivational states as a determinant of knowledge accessibility.
Motivation-induced changes in brand accessibilities are shown to contribute to the explanation of
the question-behavior effect, a well-researched effect in both consumer behavior and social
psychological research.  Specifically, the results provide direct evidence for the fact that
responding to an intention question activates an intention which instigates a specific pattern of
increased activation and inhibition among the evaluated brands. Study 1 demonstrates that
responding to an intention question increases the activation of the most preferred brand, while it
decreases the activation of the second most preferred brand. After intention completion the most
preferred brand is temporarily inhibited. Study 3 provides further support for the notion that
merely responding to an intention question may activate this intention, which instigates behavior
aligned with this motivation. Consistent with a motivational account, the occurrence of a
question-behavior effect persists as the time interval between the intention question and the
initial brand choice increases. Study 2 then demonstrates that responding to an intention question
not only affects the initial, but also the subsequent brand choice. Specifically, answering an
intention question increases the choice for the most preferred on an initial choice instance, but
decreases the choice for the most preferred brand in second instance. Showing this specific
pattern in the brand choice behavior of consumers that respond to an intention question delivers
indirect evidence for a motivational account as an underlying explanation for the question-
behavior effect, because previously suggested explanations for the question-behavior effect can
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
- 148 -
not account for these findings. Overall, these findings contribute to our knowledge on the
properties of concept activation that is evoked by a motivational state. We demonstrate the
occurrence of alternating states of activation and inhibition that occur after responding to an
intention question and performing the intended action.
 Chapter III focuses on the consequences of the recent activation of a brand. This chapter
reconciles opposing findings reported in prior research by demonstrating that a recent exposure
increases the likelihood that a brand is considered irrespective of the level of involvement. The
likelihood that this brand is eventually selected, however, only increases when decision
involvement is low. Experiment 2 demonstrated that a recent exposure may alter brand choices
of low-involved participants via two routes. When the depth of processing when attending the
presented brand is superficial, brand choices are likely to be altered by a mere increase in brand
accessibility. However, when the presented brand is processed extensively, a change in brand
choice behavior is suggested to occur through a change in the attitude toward this brand.
 The introduction described four major determinants of knowledge accessibility; that is the
strength of a construct’s activation as a function of frequency, recency, saliency and motivations,
the strength of association between constructs, the availability of retrieval cues and the scope of
conceptual attention. Chapter IV elaborates on what we termed a fourth major determinant of
knowledge accessibility, namely the conceptual scope of attention. More specifically, in this
chapter we focused on the vertical direction of attention as an element that affects the breadth of
consumers’ conceptual scope of attention. Because people generally look down to process
nearby objects and because nearby objects tend to be processed in a narrow sense, people may
have become to associate looking down with a narrow processing strategy. Hence, looking down
is shown to induce consumers to process target information with a narrow scope of conceptual
attention. As not only the strength of association between brand nodes, but also the conceptual
scope of attention affects the extent of spreading of activation, we find that looking down affects
the accessibility of brands. In addition, we also show that looking down increases the number of
categories to which consumers assign retail items, decreases the perceived prototypicality of less
prototypical brands and leads to increased preference-decision correspondence.
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2. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
 Chapters II, III and IV investigate the role of knowledge accessibility in consumer behavior
by assessing how it influences a diverse set of outcome variables. First, in line with prior
research the activation of constructs has been assessed by response latency tasks (cf., Chapter II
and Chapter IV) as they are seen as a critical measure demonstrating increased or decreased
accessibility (Jewell & Unnava, 2003). More importantly, the reported studies also show the
influence of knowledge accessibility on judgments such as attitude toward the brand (cf.,
Chapter III), and on consideration set composition (cf., Chapter III), memory-based brand
choices (in which participants are asked to select a choice option using an open-ended question;
cf., Chapter III), stimulus-based brand choices (in which participants chose from a
comprehensive list of all options; cfr., Chapter II, IV), and multiple (sequential) brand choices
(cf., Chapter II). Across all chapters we establish that knowledge accessibility can play a major
role in multiple behavioral responses.
 Further, different chapters also advance our understanding of the properties of knowledge
activation. As lined up in the introduction, knowledge activation can be instigated by different
determinants. Knowledge accessibility is likely to be characterized by different properties
dependent on the determinant that evoked the accessibility, which has implications for its
influence on consumer behavior. Hence, knowledge accessibility may operate differently
dependent on its origin.
 In Chapter II, we provide support for our thesis that merely answering an intention question
activates an intention which brings the consumers in a motivational state. The enduringness of
accessibility governed by motivational states tends to deploy a distinct pattern. Specifically,
rather than showing a decay in accessibility over time, motivation-induced accessibility is shown
to persist up until the completion of the target behavior. Hence, other than accessibility resulting
from a recent activation, we show that changes in brand activation that result from responding to
an intention question persist for as long as the intention is active. Hence, the reported findings
are in line with prior findings on the persistence of motivation-induced accessibility (Goschke
and Kuhl 1993; Bargh, et al., 2001). In addition, accounting for the enduringness of knowledge
activation is important as it determines its role in consumer behavior over time. Specifically, the
activation of a concept through a recent semantic prime is likely to have implications for
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immediate subsequent consumer behavior only. When the time lag between the priming of a
concept and the target behavior one wants to alter is extended, priming is less likely to be
effective (Higgins, Bargh & Lombardi, 1985). The influence of concepts related to an activated
motivation, however, are likely to experience increased activation over a longer period of time
(i.e., up until the motivation is completed), which holds that their influence on consumer
behavior may last longer.
 Another property of knowledge accessibility, which has not been addressed in prior
consumer behavior research, is the fact that the spreading of activation may be situation-specific.
Chapter IV elaborates on the concept of spreading of activation and demonstrates that this
spreading of activation is not solely dependent on the strength of the association between
concepts but also situation-specific. Specifically, we demonstrate that merely looking down
tends to narrow the scope of conceptual attention, while looking up tends to be associated with a
broad scope of conceptual attention. By the identification of the vertical direction of visual
attention as an efficient manipulation of the conceptual scope of attention, we identified an
important moderator of spreading of activation. As a lot of consumer behavior research uses
knowledge accessibility, and spreading of activation and inhibition as a theoretical account, the
findings reported in Chapter IV may lead us to nuance a lot of prior reported findings. For
instance, prior reported findings on indirect priming of brands can be reinforced or confined by
having consumers look up or down during priming. Hence, Chapter IV emphasizes that the role
of knowledge accessibility in consumer behavior may depend on the scope of conceptual
attention.
 Rather than focusing on the properties of knowledge accessibility, Chapter III focuses on the
fact that the influence of a recent activation tends to differ according to the manner in which the
brand prime was attended. Specifically, both a lower and a deeper level of processing of the
primed brand can alter the choice decisions of low involved consumers, albeit via different
attitudinal mechanisms. While merely superficially attending the focal brand alters choice
decisions without changing the actual attitudes consumers hold, profound processing of the focal
brand is more likely to exert its influence on decision making by improving the preferences for
the focal brand. In addition, this Chapter also focuses on the conditions in which increased
knowledge activation alters subsequent memory-based brand choices. Hence, it identifies factors
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that affect the extent of the influence of knowledge activation on brand choices and shows that
knowledge accessibility is more likely to affect brand choices when decision involvement is low.
3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 In general, the findings reported in the Chapters II, III and IV include valuable suggestions
for practitioners. Chapter III reports on consumer behavior outcomes in response to recent
exposures to stimuli. These findings are especially useful to be applied in in-store
communications. Specifically, in-store communication may have a pervasive effect on
consumers’ choices, merely by increasing a target brand’s accessibility. Just by being present in
the retail environment a brand name may become more accessible, which is likely to have an
effect on brand choices when consumers are low involved with choosing from the product
category. Furthermore, when the communication attempt succeeds in instigating a deeper level of
processing, the attitude toward the brand may improve. A change in the attitude toward the brand
is likely to be a more enduring change, compared to a more temporal increase in a brand’s
accessibility. Consequently, this brand attitude is likely to guide not only the immediate choice
decision, but also the choice on a subsequent instance may be in favor of the advertised brand.
 Our findings also suggest that marketers could adapt the vertical positioning of in-store
advertising in order to increase advertising effectiveness. Specifically, by using floor-level
advertising rather than using advertisements that are attached to the ceiling, the ad may only
increase the accessibility of the advertised brand rather than simultaneously increasing the
accessibility of competing brands. By this targeted increase in brand accessibility, the ad is likely
to boost the choice for the advertised brand rather than creating an increase in product category
purchases spread across all available brands.
 Chapter II on the other hand describes what happens with intention-related cognitions in
terms of accessibility whenever an intention is activated and shows that the changes in
accessibility have implications for brand choices. The most interesting property of these changes
in accessibility for practitioners is that they are likely to be persistent. Therefore, practitioners
could profit from consumers forming an intention to purchase their brand prior to store entrance.
Prior research has shown that inducing consumers to make a behavioral prediction can occur
through mass media communications (Spangenberg, Sprott, Grohmann & Smith, 2003). Hence,
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advertising can have a larger effect on sales by merely including an intention question in the
advertisement.
 Furthermore, not only the finding that the intention-related option becomes more accessible,
but also the finding that distracting choice options are inhibited after responding to an intention
question may have implications for brand choices. Specifically, when the brand a consumer
intends to choose is out-of-stock, consumers may choose a less preferred brand if they have
previously answered an intention question, due to the inhibition of their well-preferred,
distracting brands. Therefore, it may be important for manufacturers to ensure well-preferred
brands appear on the retail floor to override this inhibition.
4. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
 In spite of the above contributions, future research is needed to deal with the limitations of
our studies and to further our understanding on the role of knowledge accessibility in consumer
behavior. Below, we will focus on the most important and general limitations and provide
suggestions for future research.
 Despite the pervasive role played by knowledge accessibility in consumer judgments and
decision making, in real-life situations consumer behavior is often the end-product of the
interplay of multiple factors. Hence, in almost every situation, all sorts of factors may be present
that offset the reported findings. For instance, although motivation-induced changes in brand
accessibilities are thought of as very powerful guides of consumer behavior, several elements
may offset their impact. Focusing on the influence of motivational states, the question on how
multiple higher-level goals and lower-level intentions interact in their guidance of behavior has
not yet received a clear answer. Will merely responding to an intention question also result in a
change in subsequent behavior when the questioned behavior is clearly in opposition with an
active goal? Or, when an intention is tied to an activated goal, will only the intended behavior or
also other behaviors in line with the activated goal lead to goal satiation? Although responding to
an intention question may be a powerful guide of subsequent consumer behavior, intentions and
their associated pattern of changes in accessibilities are not likely to operate in isolation; their
impact may be offset or reinforced by other, higher-level motivations. Furthermore, the extent of
the influence of motivation-induced brand accessibilities may depend on how it was acquired.
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Chapter II investigated changes in brand accessibilities in response to answering an intention
question. Changes in brand activation might be even more extreme when the motivational state is
self-generated, rather than acquired through a suggestion of another person (Higgins & King,
1981).
 The studies reported in Chapter III demonstrate that the impact of recently activated
knowledge may be offset when the consumers are highly involved. When consumers are highly
involved, they are motivated to consider more information prior to decision making. Further,
when processing at encoding is extensive, it is not mere brand accessibility that is likely to alter
choice behavior. Rather, choices are altered by a change in attitudes. These findings indicate that
consumers rely on knowledge accessibility with varying degrees in shaping their responses in
choice situations.
 Evidence of spreading-activation effects is omnipresent in the cognitive literature (e.g.,
Anderson & Pirolli, 1984; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Loftus, 1973) and illustrations of its
implications are vast in consumer behavior literature (e.g., Berger & Fitzsimons, 2008; Lajos,
Katona, Chattopadhyay & Sarvary, 2008; Nedungadi, 1990; Nenycz-Thiel, Sharp, Dawes &
Romaniuk, 2010). Chapter IV shows that the influence of spreading of activation may be
constrained by merely having participants look down. Hence, the spreading of activation to
semantically related brands can be negated by simply presenting relevant information in the
lower part of the visual field.
 The studies exclusively report on experimental studies, both with fictitious and existing
stimuli. Irrespective of the fact that this method was most adequate in formulating an answer to
our research questions and hypotheses, a great opportunity for future research lies in the
validation of the reported results in field experiments. Also, addressing the proposed practical
implications directly in field experiments would advance the practical relevance of this
dissertation. For instance, Chapter III presents a case for the importance of brand exposure in
decision making. There have been, however, very few examinations of such effects in real-world
contexts (Berger & Fitzsimons, 2008). Also, a field test that compares the effectiveness of floor-
level to ceiling-level advertising, or a field study investigating whether on-line purchase behavior
tends to differ according to the height at which their computer monitor is placed, would be of
great value in strengthening the implications of the findings reported in Chapter IV.
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 Eye-tracking may play an important role in these field studies. Given that visual attention is
prerequisite for increasing accessibility, a comparison of floor-level to ceiling-level advertising
should incorporate eye-tracking measures to account for differences in the amount of attention.
Specifically, when attributing floorboard effectiveness to a reduced conceptual scope of
attention, eye-tracking data can be used to control for the amount of attention that is given to
advertisements. Controlling for the amount of attention has the advantage that participants are
not forced to give attention to experimental manipulations.
 Though the reported studies provide a good overview of the breadth of behavioral responses
that can be influenced by knowledge accessibility, one shortcoming of this dissertation certainly
is the limited amount of attention that has been paid to the role of consciousness in the retrieval
of accessible information and the use of this accessible information in judgments and choice
decisions. The properties of knowledge accessibility engendered by different determinants
served as a starting point for this dissertation, rather than the manner in which accessibility alters
consumer behavior. Hence, regarding the results of the reported studies we simply acknowledge
that the influence of accessibility may have a more implicit or explicit origin; we, however, do
not explicitly account for this in our papers. Hence, we did not make an explicit distinction
between measures that are more likely to be influenced by the conscious or unconscious
influence of knowledge accessibility. Nevertheless, based on a combination of the reported
findings and the findings reported in prior research, we can state that knowledge accessibility has
pervasive effects on consumer judgments and behavior. A large diversity of phenomena may
directly and indirectly be influenced by the concepts and knowledge that people happen to have
accessible in memory at the time they make a judgment or decision (Wyer, 2008).
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